THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE:
A PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION FOR
PROGRAMMES IN PUBLIC ART GALLERIES

A Thesis Presented to the Art Education Division
0£ the The Nova Scotia College 0£ Art and Design
in partial ful£illment 0£ the requirements for the
Degree 0£ Master of Arts in Art Education.

NOVA SCOTIA COLLEGE OF ART \
AND DESIGN LIBRARY

by

Katherine Brown
April 1984

 ABSTRACT

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE:
A PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION FOR
PROGRAMMES IN PUBLIC ART GALLERIES
Katherine Brown
This study examines the relationship between viewers
and works 0£ art.

An overview 0£ philosophers~ statements

about the aesthetic experience, based on Stephen Pepper's
World Hypothesis Theory, is presented.

This overview

establishes central questions about the nature a£ this
experience.

These are investigated through an examination

of the nature of the art obJect, as outlined in the writings
0£ Susanne Langer, and of the aesthetic experience, as
delineated by Mikel Du£renne. The theories 0£ these two
philosophers establish the unique nature of the work 0£ art
and of the aesthetic experience.

This experience is founded

upon the expressiveness 0£ the work 0£ art, and the viewer's
recognition 0£ that expressiveness through three levels in
aesthetic experience: Presence, Re£lection and Feeling.
Finally, the aesthetic attitude, as a necessity £or
aesthetic experiencing, is investigated.

A rationale is

presented £or considering the aesthetic experience as the
appropriate foundation for gallery programming.

The

implications 0£ such a £oundation are outlined, and
practical strategies are suggested.
- iii -

 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the members 0£ my committee
£or their support,
and, especially, the Chairman, Nicholas Webb,
who worked long hours on my behalf.

- iv -

 CONTENTS
Page

PREFACE

vii

Chapter

1.

2.

AESTHETIC EXPERIENCES
Introduction

1

Descriptions of Aesthetic Experiences

2

Conclusion .

7

PHILOSOPHIC THEORIES ABOUT AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE
Introduction • . •

3.

9

World Hypotheses and the Aesthetic Experience

• 11

Conclusion . .

•

29

THE ART SYMBOL:
SUSANNE LANGER'S THEORY OF EXPRESSIVENESS
Introduction.

. 32

The Theory of Susanne Langer: A Select Summary. 33
• 41

Conclusion
4.

MIKEL DUFRENNE:
A SCHEMA FOR AESTHETIC EXPERIENCING
Introduction . • .

44

A Theory of Aesthetic Experience.

.

48

Langer and Dufrenne: Compatible Theories?

•

59

Conclusion

• 61

- V -

 5.

THE AESTHETIC ATTITUDE:
A FOUNDATION FOR AESTHETIC EXPERIENCING
Introduction
The Aesthetic Attitude

•

•

•

•

•

Conclusion

•

•

63

•

•

64

•

• 71

POSTSCRIPT: PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
BIBLIOGRAPHY

76
•

- vi -

•

• 81

 PREFACE

Art_GalleriesL_Works_o£_ArtL_S2ectators.
Art galleries bring works 0£ art and viewers
together.

Decisions on programming

in

a public gallery may,

there£ore, be based on the needs 0£ the obJect, the needs 0£
the spectator, or on the relationship between works 0£ art
and viewers 0£ art.
upon the obJect.

At present, the emphasis seems to be

The International Council 0£ Museums

employs the same de£inition £or both the public art gallery
and the general museum, a de£inition based on the obJect:
A museum is a permanent establishment
administered in the public interest, with a view
to conserve, study, exploit by various means and
basically to exhibit, £or the pleasure and
education 0£ the public, obJects 0£ cultural
value. Cl]
Education programmes in art galleries o£ten
emphasize the obJect.

Group tours and lectures £eaturing

information about art obJects, and making art historical
connections, are a common o££ering, especially £or adult
visitors.

The critical analysis 0£ the work 0£ art,

stressing care£ul looking and using all available £acts, is
thought to £aster "visual literacy" and

11

appreciation.

11

The

relationship between the individual viewer and the work 0£

1. Kenneth Hudson, A_Social_Histor~_of_Museums:_What_the
Visitor_Thought <London: Macmillan, 1975), p.1.

- vii -

 art seems often to be overlooked.
Lectures and analysis usually treat works of art as
obJects which are little different from other puzzling
obJects in need of explanation.

Yet, our treatment of art

obJects suggests that we do recognize a difference between
these and other obJects.

We often call obJects ~n general

museums ""-artifacts,"" and tend to value them as much for
their educational, heritage, sentimental, or curiousity
value as for their aesthetic content.

ObJects found in art

galleries are generally called ""works of art.""

We house

them in separate sections of general museums or in buildings
specifically de.signed for their preservation and display.
We value them for their ""beauty,"' their ""expressiveness,"" or
their ""exemplary form,·· for v irtue.s we regard as
"'aesthetic."" Some theorists suggest that obJect.s displayed
in art galleries are the source of a special experience, an
experience different from all others in degree or in kind,
which they cal 1 the ··aesthetic experience.""
It mu.st be admitted that a movement to address the
individual viewer has begun in gallery education.
Information sheets for visitors are provided by galleries
such as the Art Gallery of Hamilton and the Art Gallery of
Ontario. Labels and didactic panels abound.
are often available in larger galleries.

Audiotape tours

Gallery educators

seem to be searching for a way to foster a more discerning
awareness in spectators, yet continuing to concentrate their
efforts mainly on the provision of intellectual

- viii -

 information.

But, is interaction betwen viewers and works

of art exclusively intellectual?

Perhaps attention should

be given to other kinds of relationships that may be
established when viewers meat art obJacts in a gallery
setting.
I propose, therefore, to undertake a philosophical
investigation of the nature of the relationship between
viewers and art ob.Jects in what is called the ··aesthetic
experience,•• and to articulate the implications of these
philosophical £indings £or programming in public art
galleries.

- ix -

 Chapter One

AESTHETIC EXPERIENCES

,
Introduction
I£ I am to investigate the aesthetic experience, it
is necessary to be sure Just what experiences I am
considering because many situations may be called
"aesthetic.•• When, £or example, I view a sunset, en Joy a
beautiful garden, appreciate a well desigried piece of
£urniture1 hike through the woods on a sunny day, li~ten to

my experience as aesthetic.

Since I am interested in

viewers in art galleries, it seems practical to confine the
£ield to experiences with works 0£ visual art: painting,
sculpture and the like.
I must still establish the experiences within
gallery walls which most interest me.

A£ter all,

many di££erent experiences in a gallery.

I may have

I may talk to a

friend who works there, gain some historical in£ormation
£ram a painting, consult a book, or read an art magazine.
In each case I may see the same pictures or sculptures but
my experiences of them may not be aesthetic.
I could, at this point, begin to examine what
happens to viewers in various situations in a gallery,
- 1 -

 attempting to discover which situations are aesthetic or
non-aesthetic, but how would I classi£y these
experiences?[l)

I lack criteria which will identi£y a

situation as aesthetic.

I£ I propose an hypothesis which

characteristizes an "aesthetic experience," on what shall I
base my assumptions?

Can I search empirically for something

as elusive as personal experience?
Perhaps my most reasonable beginning is to remain
with the assumption that some 0£ our experiences with art
obJects di££er in degree or in kind £rem other experiences,
and may, because 0£ this difference, be Judged aesthetic..
can then initiate my study by describing some personal
experiences with art obJects in art galleries, experiences
impressed on my mind as

11

di££erent

11

or "special," and then

continue by outlining what philosophers have said about
similar experiences.

DescriEtions_o£_Aesthetic_ExEeriences
February, 1973
I am climbing the stone steps 0£ the Art Institute
0£ Chicago as I have done every Friday morning £or the past
month.

I anticipate with pleasure half a day 0£ looking at

1. This thesis addresses the nature 0£ the aesthetic
experience of adults.
Words such as viewer, ·· or
"'spectator" should, therefore, be presumed to refer to
adults.
11

-

2

-

I

 pictures.

I pass through the revolving doors.

A£ter the

chill wind and the long train ride £ram the suburbs, the
warmth 0£ the huge £eyer is welcoming.
the massive architecture.
to know each other.

I am not repelled by

The gallery and I are be~inning

A£ter giving my heavy coat into ' the

care 0£ a cloakroom guard, I mount the marble staircase with
lighter tread toward the sign reading ' "European Art."
This is the £i£th or sixth in a series 0£ visits to
the Art Institute which will take place over a four month
period.

Previously, I had come here with my husband and

children.

These visits are my first opportunity to wander

the galleries at will, alone with my thoughts, and my first
experience 0£ extended looking in a maJor art gallery.
I have been walking through the galleries
chronologically, stopping to study whatever draws my eye or
engages my imagination.

I enJoy this process 0£ choice.

I

bring to it an eye trained by several years of undergraduate
study in graphic design and £our years 0£ Friday afternoons
spent drawing in the Royal Ontario Museum, plus a fund of
knowledge gained from art books, courses in art history, and
visits to galleries.
I have reached the Seventeenth Century. I enter a
room hung with portraits and still lifes, masterworks from
the Dutch, Italian and Spanish schools.

I know that

paintings by an artist 0£ more than ordinary interest to me
are displayed here.

Suddenly, my eye is caught by a
-

3

-

 portrait hanging beside the £ar doorway.
by an irresistible £orce.

I am drawn to it

The room recedes.

At this

moment, this painting, this presence 0£ a girl who lived
centuries ago, who stands looking with enquiring g&ze out 0£
an open hal£-door,

is more real than the gallery, more real

to me than my eel£.

For a £ew moments,

I am out 0£ time and

place, £illed with a £eeling that is new to me and which I
do not understand.
These moments pass.
recognition, I

In the £irst Jolt 0£

perceived this as a work 0£ Rembrandt. Now I

study it care£ully.

I admire the expertise exempli£ied by

the single brush strokes delineating the pleating of the
white chemise, the lacing 0£ the bodice, and £olds 0£ the
skirt.
me.

The monumental bulk 0£ this simple £igure astonishes

Is this what drew me to her?

I was not drawn by the

colour, unless because these subtle golden browns and reds
signal "Rembrandt" to my eye.

Now I note the studied

placement 0£ the necklace, mirroring the simple curve 0£ the
bodice neckline.

Rembrandt must have arrranged it.

rhythm 0£ turned head and bent arm attract me.

The

Is this the

secret 0£ her £ascination, or is it her hal£ smile?

I note

with interest that the line 0£ the upper arm has been
changed.

The aging oil paint reveals Rembrandt's

adJustment.

I assess the di££erence.

I think 0£ the painter's li£e.

Yes, it looks right.

When was this done?

the label: 1645. Mid-career. A mature work.

I read

I think and

look, look and think, but still I do not understand why this
-

4 -

 painting has moved me so.

And why now?

I know that I have

seen it several times be£ore.

I step back and look again.

I

£ind that I

can

The experience is deeper and

re-enter the timelesssness.

richer, coloured by my examination 0£, and re£lections on
the work.
Every Friday morning, at the beginning 0£ my hours
in the Art Institute, I
its meaning.

visit the Rembrandt. I

Why does it draw me to itsel£?

search £or

I cannot £ind

the answer.

July, 1983 -

I am going to an art gallery, to attend the opening
0£ an exhibition 0£ tapestry hangings.
£orward to this evening.

I have been looking

I usually like looking at

weavings, especially at tapestries.

I enter and look from the mezzanine down into the
main gallery.

Wow!

I am smitten by the size, the design,

the textures, the colours 0£ these magni£icent works 0£
art.

I go quickly down the stairs.

smiling.

I

know that I

Inside, I £eel like running and shouting!

am
I pass

£ram hanging to hanging, marvelling at many, enJoying most.
I £eel that I am in a great visual £east 0£ texture and
colour.

-

5

-

 I stay until the gallery closes.

When the lights

are turned down, I climb again to the mezzanine, and turn
£or one last look.

The metal rods woven into a huge hanging

on the end wall glow golden against their background 0£
dusky wool.

Never have I seen anything like this.

on unexpected beauty.

I gaze

I £ind it hard to tear mysel£ away,

to leave what have become, £or me, animated obJects,
su££used with a li£e 0£ their own.

August, 1983.
I am standing in a long, narrow hallway, painted
bright yellow, and hung with small original prints.

In a

£ew minutes, I have an appointment with the owner 0£ this
consulting agency.

I decide to look at some 0£ the prints.

Most of them I have seen before.

My gaze is desultory as it

slides across each white rectangle laced with dark lines.
am not bored, neither am I very excited~
neutral.

I

My mood seems

I am attracted to several etchings by Anna

Syperek, one with many interlocking branches, a depiction 0£
bushes against snow; the other an urban scene shown through
a window: snow, and bushes, and trees, and houses.
to compare these two prints.

I begin

I £eel the second is better

because the lines are very crisp and clear.
plate has been very nicely wiped.

The etching

I look more care£ully,

concentrating on the placement 0£ the bushes in the snow, on
the shapes between the houses, on the pattern made by roo£s
-

6

-

 My eye runs back and £orth, tracing a zig-zag

and windows.

path, making links, following lines, connecting shapes.
Suddenly, a change occurs.

I am inside the
I have stepped through

It is working around me.

picture.

the window £rame into the back yard.
the scene.

I

£eel it is real: 1£ I

I am suspended within
stretch out my hand I

may touch the lines of the trees, the planes 0£ roo£ and
wall.

The special £eeling passes quickly, £or I must go to

my meeting.

Yet, I can carry it within me, and recall at

will the "click" when a roo£ made of inked lines became as
real as one made 0£ shingles.

CONCLUSION
These descriptions outline something 0£ the nature
of my own aesthetic experiences.
sort of event is not unusual.
experiences.

I am convinced that this

Other people have similar

I have sometimes watched them, standing

engrossed £or many minutes, fascinated by a painting or
sculpture.

I have talked with them 0£ the delight they £eel

in looking at art.
My problem is that these experiences seem to be
related, yet each is, in its way, unique.

What is the

nature of the relationship between these experiences?
aesthetic experience cognitive or emotional?

Is my

Are my

£eelings ordinary feelings intensified, or £eelings 0£ a
-

7

-

 di££erent kind?

What is my own contribution# and what is

the contribution 0£ the art obJect?

Do I need special

perceptive powers in order to have this experience?

In the

£ace of such confusion# let us now examine what ph~losophers
have said about this experience.

-

8

-

 Chapter Two

PHILOSOPHIC THEORIES ABOUT AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

Introduction

Some philosophers have proposed quite speci£ic
theories about aesthetic experience.

The more general

comments 0£ others have, at least, implications £or a theory
0£ aesthetic experience.

In this chapter, I present an

overview 0£ what philosophers have, over time, stated or
implied about this experience.
Stephen Pepper gives an outline, in

~Q~!~

tl~EQ~h~§~~, 0£ £our general approaches to making sense of
the world.

These general approaches he names "World

Hypotheses." They constitute £our £undamentally discrete
outlooks which control the methodology used by philosophers
in their interpretation and explanation 0£ evidence.

Pepper

suggests that a philosopher will generally subscribe to the
approach 0£ one of these four broad groupings, and this will
cause his theories to differ markedly £ram those outlined by
members 0£ other groupings.

In order to assist our

understanding 0£ his World Hypotheses, Pepper introduces the
concept 0£ the "root metaphor,

-

11

a clue or symbol £or the

9

-

 approach of each World View.tlJ
It is important to remember that the idea of World
Hypotheses is theoretical.

Pepper's observations about

philosophy do not necessarily coincide with how philosophers
have characterized their own work.

In addition, the £our

World Hypotheses which Pepper suggest~ are valid,

(i.e.,

more or less coherent and consistent, exhibiting both scope
and precision), are not neat boxes into which we can drop
philosophers, expecting them to stay inside. [2]

The theory

represents tendencies or emphases of thought, not
categorical parameters.

It should probably be regarded as a

loose way of organizing philosophers' world views, and of
grasping an outline of philosophic thought on a subJect, not
as a neat and tidy way of dividing up the field.
In The_Basis_of_Criticism_in_the_Arts, Pepper
applies his World Hypothesis Theory more specifically to
Art, in an attempt to establish a theory of art criticism.
The examination and implied de£initions of aesthetic
experience which he includes in this book are coloured by
this particular purpose, and cannot be assumed to be
exhaustive.

Even so, his book provides an outline of what

philosophers have said about aesthetic experience.

I shall,

1. Stephen Pepper, World_Hy~otheses:_A_Study_in_Evidence
(1942; rpt.
Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of
California Press, 1970), pp.84-114.

2. Stephen Pepper, The_Basis_of_Criticism_in_the_Arts
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), p.8.
This outline is baaed on Pepper's "Introduction," pp.1-10.
- 10 -

 there£ore, base my overview 0£ philosophic theories
regarding the aesthetic experience on Pepper's World
Hypothesis Theory, re£erring mainly to The_Basis_o£
Criticism_in_the_Arts. Points where I digress £ram his
theory, or introduce modi£ications will be noted.

I ·shall

begin by examining the £irst 0£ Pepper's £our valid World
Views.

World_HyEotheses_and_the_Aesthetic_ExEerience
1. Mechanism
In order to help us understand this category, Pepper
suggests the Root Metaphor 0£ "A Machine."(3] This theory
has a particularly close relationship with certain
scientific methodologies.

Pepper suggests that the

Mechanist sets all things in their position in relation to
other things, and regards them as associated yet separate in
the same way that:
• any chemical atom always has its
spacio-temporal location distinct from any other
chemical atom and has its own specific ways 0£
acting upon and responding to other chemical atoms
<as well as) its own valency and affinities
whether or not it combines with other atoms. (4)
The Mechanist regards man as a particular in a huge

3. For a more complete explanation 0£ Pepper's notions about
Mechanism, see Pepper, 1942, pp.186-231.
4. Pepper, 1965, p.37.

- 11 -

 system 0£ essentially separate entities which react to one
another, producing the world we know.

Our behaviour,

£eelings, and values, the result 0£ reaction to external
stimuli, are governed by internal physiological connections
within us.

These postulations have important rami£ications

£or the Mechanist theory 0£ aesthetic experience.
Mechanist philosophers base their theory 0£
aesthetic experience on the assumption that pleasure is
11

good" and pain is "bad," and emphasize the pleasure we £eel

when we regard an art obJect. C5J

In an aesthetic

experience, we submit ourselves to the obJect and register
intense pleasurable £eelings with our body.

Mechanists

regard these £eelings as di££erent £rem other £eelings
because, though they are generated within us, we regard our
registering 0£ colours and shapes, and our £eeling 0£
pleasure, as associated with and generated by the obJect.
It is these pleasurable feelings which attract us to art
obJects, Just as all animals react positively to pleasant
stimuli. C6J

Pleasurable £eelings, then, characterize both

our aesthetic experiences and the aesthetic obJect.
This seems to render the aesthetic £ield di££icult
to de£ine.

Presumably, anything which generates pleasurable

5. By "art obJect," I mean the physical obJect, the arti£act
made by the artist.
I shall use the words "work 0£ art'"
when re£erring to the art obJect as it interacts with the
viewer in aesthetic experience.
6. It is clear that Pepper has in mind the work 0£
stimulus-response theorists.

- 12 -

 feelings could be classed as an aesthetic obJect.

Moreover,

pleasure as the defining feature of aesthetic experience
raises the problem of works of art which are powerful in
their effect but which do not afford us pleasure in. any
common sense of the word.

Can, for example, the term

"pleasurable 11 adequately describe our experience of works by
Expressionists such as Ensor and Munch, Surrealists like De
Chirico, and Moderns such as Rauschenberg and de Koening?
Are works that elicit feelings of pain or horror, disgust or
confusion, to be considered "bad" or non-aesthetic?
Mechanist theory appears adequate only to describe our
experiences with a narrow range of art works.
It also seems that Mechanism does not adequately
explain the complete range of our interaction with works of
art during our aesthetic experiences.

This theory

emphasizes the physical beginning of the aesthetic
experience, the Jolt I felt on first seeing Young_Girl_at_an
Oeen-Half-Door, or my fist excitement in gazing upon the
tapestries.

These first physical impressions developed into

complex interactions with these works of art, interactions
which seem beyond the Mechanist explanation.

My experience

in looking at Young_Girl_at_an_Oeen_Half-Door included more
than the registering of intense pleasurable feelings: my
intellect was involved as well as my senses.

My experience

with the print by Anna Syperek seemed more intellectual than
emotional.

It seems ~that intellect adds something to my own

pleasure in looking at works of art, yet Mechanistic theory
-

13 -

 admits only the re£ining 0£ the senses, so that we may gain
the maximum in sensuous pleasure. C7J

In addition, our

sensuous pleasure o£ten seems to evolve into a deeper
£eeling than mere physical enJoyment.

2. Contextualism
Pepper suggests that the Root Metaphor 0£ this World
View , ia the "Historic Event, .. not in the sense 0£ the

history 0£ the past, but as".
its present."C8J
aeries 0£ events.
independent.

. the event alive and in

Contextualists regard the world as a
"Things" are not discrete and

They are combined in mutual interactions.

A

Contextualist would agree with the Mechanist that a chemical
atom has its own valence and a££inities.

He would, however,

place emphasis not on the atom itael£, but on the compounds
in which it appears and on how these compounds combine with
or affect other substances.
In this World Hypothesis, change is an important
£actor.

Everything can be said to be relative: we must know

the situation in detail in order to understand a
phenomenon.

We are a part 0£ our environment, and

constantly interact with it.

Thus, our action in an

7. Pepper, 1965, p.51.
8. Pepper, 1942, p.232.
For a more detailed outline 0£
Contextualism, see pp.232-279.

- 14 -

 experience is coloured by the environment and by previous
events and actions.

When we act, we change the situation

permanently: the situation and the participants within it
can never revert to what they were be£ore.

Each si~uation ,

in its turn, influences those which £allow.

Since the

experience itsel£ is central to this World View, our
feelings and values arise £ram the

11

quality

0£ situations:

11

strong feelings are the result 0£ wide and deep experience.
The Contextualist de£initio~ 0£ aesthetic experience
as "voluntary vivid intuitions 0£ quality" C9J ·

emphasizes

the richness, breadth, and depth 0£ our experiences with art
We can learn much about the Contextualist's theory

obJects.

0£ aesthetic experience through a careful examination 0£ the
individual words 0£ this short definition.

Its apparent

simplicity masks complex ideas.
11

Voluntary'' suggests a basic di££erence between the

Contextualist and the Mechanist theory 0£ aesthetic
experience: the experience is an act of £ree will, not a
conditioned response.

This implies a certain amount 0£

choice and active participation, i£ only in our decision to
remain open to the advent 0£ this experience.
"Intuition" highlights another di££erence between
Mechanist and Contextualist theory.

We use the word in the

same contexts as the phrases, .. I have a feeling that

9. Pepper, 1965, p.56.

- 15 -

.,

 or "I have a hunch that.

., .. in situations where we wish

to indicate that our ideas are being in£luenced by our inner
£eelings.

Both physical and intellectual input are implied

in such sudden insights.

The Contextualist de£init~on thus

suggests that the import 0£ the aesthetic stiuation is
immediately registered through both our physical and
intellectual capacities, a more complex beginning than is
constituted by the Mechanist's idea 0£ pleasure.
11

Vivid

11

and "quality" are connected in Contextualist

theory, £or it is the vividness 0£ the situation which
grants quality to this experience and which characterizes it
as aesthetic rather than ordinary.

To the Contextualist,

aesthetic experience runs through all of life.

Our

experiences with works of art are special because they are
0£ a dif£erent "character," or "quality, .. and the
qualitative di££erence is mani£ested in greater richness,
breadth, and depth; in the mood, or even the personality 0£
the event. ClOJ
The vividness 0£ aesthetic experience arises out 0£
the aesthetic aspects 0£ the situation.

Pepper suggests

that these are quality, intuition, £usion, and unity.

Here,

I shall diverge £ram his terminology, by substituting
.. integration" £or

11

£usion.

This change is made in the

11

service 0£ clarifying the spirit 0£ Pepper's writing, and
does not mark an attempt to turn this general description 0£

10. Pepper, 1965, p.57.
-

16 -

 Pepper's position into a critical interpretation.

Fusion

does not admit degrees of occurrence: it suggests the
blending or welding 0£ separate things into one.

This term

seems to conflict with one 0£ the basic emphases 0£
Contextualist theory: the varied degrees of quality we
intuit in experiences which are in other respects similar.
I suggest, therefore, that Contextualists would be more
likely to choose integration as an aesthetic aspect 0£
experience. [11)

They would suggest that the greater the

integration 0£ details into our aesthetic experiences, the
greater our intuition of unity <and in consequence, of
quality), in the situation.
We recognize the aesthetic aspects 0£ an event
through analysis 0£ its details.

These details, £or the

Contextualist, include every aspect 0£ the aesthetic event.
Every snippet 0£ information we can bring to mind about the
art obJect and the artist may be part of our analysis of the
situation.

Vet, the Contextualist recognizes danger in

analysis during aesthetic experience.

Examination 0£ the

details may destroy our intuition 0£ the quality 0£ the
situation, lessen our feeling 0£ the integration, and thus
destroy unity. ·

It can lead us out 0£ aesthetic experience.

So, though Contextualists admit analysis to their model £or
aesthetic experience, they are wary 0£ it.

11. I realize that "Integration" ·1 s suggested by Pepper as a
Root Metaphor 0£ Organicism. I will address this matter in
my section on Organicism.
- 17 -

 Finally, in keeping with the root metaphor

11

Historic

Event," the Contextualist notes that environmental,
cultural, societal and historical contexts surround and
in£luence our experiences.

Contextualists are impr~ssed by

the changing characteristics and relative importance ' o£
these £actors £ram age to age and, in some situations, £rem
minute to minute.

Each 0£ our aesthetic experiences,

there£ore, di££ers in quality and builds on those be£ore it
towards a more complete understanding.

Pepper names this

aspect 0£ Contextualist theory "£unding." The work 0£ art
is, in consequence, not simply the physical mani£estation we
see be£ore us, but our £unded understanding 0£ it.
The Contextualist theory 0£ aesthetic experience
comes closer than does the Mechanist view to accounting £or
my own experiences with art.

Intuition accounts £or the

£act that I o£ten £eel I understand the work 0£ art be£ore
thinking about it.

The notion of funding, and the

importance 0£ context accounts £or the enrichment 0£ my
aesthetic experiences through intellectual analysis, such as
that 0£ Young_Girl_at_an_O~en_Hal£-Door, and 0£ the Syperek
print.

Even so, I £ind aspects 0£ my own experience which

seem beyond the reaches 0£ Contextualist explanation.

The

Contextualist seems to regard an aesthetic experience as
something like a child 1 s Jig saw in which each component is
a cut-out which may be removed and examined in isolation.
But when I think about my own experiences, I £ind it
difficult to examine one part without taking into account
-

18 -

 the others.

My own aesthetic experiences seem to be much

more unified than the Contextualist is willing to admit.
The Contextualist viewpoint expands our description
of aesthetic experience, yet the emphasis on the experience
itself is the genesis of a basic problem.

For many

Contextualists the importance 0£ context and the concept of
funding lead to £ludity in aesthetic value: what is, or is
not classified as an art obJect depends on the viewer, the
time, and the place.
art?"

Nelson .Goodman's question "When is

replaces the traditional query .. What is art? ..

Goodman suggests that we construct many different versions
0£ the world using varied yet internally coherent methods 0£
thinking.

Each world version is valid in relation to time,

place, and circumstances.

So, for instance, there is a

world version valid foi physics, another valid for religion,
still another valid for Art. As a group, our world versions
constitute the World as we know it.
World, but only many worlds.

Indeed, there is no

The world £or art is itself

composed of worlds constituted by many different people in
many different ways, consequently, .. an obJect may be a work
of art at some times and not at others."(12]

I concede the

logic 0£ Goodman's position, but cannot wholly accept it.
Some obJects, after all, seem to stand outside time and
place.

I cannot quite convince myself that Michelangelo's

12. Nelson Goodman, Waya_of_Worldmaking <Indianapolis,
Indiana: Hacket, 1978>, pp.66-67.
Goodman does not call
himself a Contextualist, but his theory £its this World
View.
- 19 -

 Q~~!g, a sel£ portrait by Rembrandt, or a Benin bronze,
would not elicit special attention £ram many people in many
times and places; even £rom those to whom the word
"aesthestic" is unknown.

Despite the Contextualist's

skeptical attitude toward £inal Judgement, there appears,

in

practice, to be a group 0£ obJects called "art."

3. Organicism
Pepper suggests that the Root Metaphors £or this
World Hypothesis are "Integration," and "Organicism.
states that the Organicist seeks"

11

He

a condition where no

detail can be removed or altered without marring or even
destroying the value 0£ the whole.
an organic unity ...

Such a whole is called

[13) This statement seems to describe

"£usion" rather than "integration." Kenneth Beittel, writing
0£ Organicism, describes this World View as £ocussing on
"wholeness which is implied by the organic £usion 0£
qualitative immediate presents into one consummatory
experience."C14J

I shall there£ore, and again only in the

interests 0£ clarity, diverge £rem Pepper's terminology,
suggesting "Fusion" as a Root Metaphor more appropriate to
the interpretation 0£ Organicism.

13. Pepper, 1965, p.79.
For a more complete outline 0£
Organicism, see Pepper, 1942., pp.280-314.
14. Kenneth Beittel, "Unity 0£ Truth, Language, and Method
in Art Education, Studies_in_Art_Education, 21., No.1 (1979),
p.53.
-

20 -

 The Organicist, like the Contextualist, is
Rather

interested in events, experiences, or processes.

than examining a situation in the light 0£ its contexts,
however, he analyses relations between participants in the
event, seeking the ties which establish the organic whole.
We are not separate entities, as in M~chanism, nor are we
integrated into the world, as in the Contextualist World
View. We are within the world, and it is within us, £used
with us through our experiences.

Feeling and value arise,

to the Organicist, £ram the internal relatedness and
coherence 0£ ev~nts: the ultimate organic ties.
In Organicism, £eeling is central to aesthetic
experience.

This £eeling is not the "pure pleasure"

emphasized in Mechanism, nor is it even the "vivid quality"
central to Contextualism. Perhaps Bosanquet's description is
appropriate: ".

• it is a relevant £eeling .

• attached,

annexed to the quality 0£ some obJect - to all its
detail."[15J

The quality of the obJect is not set, as in

Contextualism, by the vividness, breadth, and depth 0£ the
feeling.

Rather, quality, and feeling itself, is a

possession 0£ the art obJect, arising from the right
relations and connections established between the details 0£
line, colour, shape, and texture in£used into the work
through the artist's creative imagination.

Thus, though the

15. Bosanquet, Three_Lectures_on_Aesthetic (1915; rpt.
York: Bobbs-Merrill, Cn.d.J), p.6.
- 21 -

New

 Organicist is interested in events or experiences, his
additional concern with processes and connections
constitutes the art obJect as an equal partner with the
viewer in aesthetic experience.

Another participant

appears, as well, £or the artist hovers in the background.
It is he who directs the event through the relations and
connections which uni£y the work.
In aesthetic experience, we submit ourselves to the
art obJect ..

We £eel absorbed into the unique £eeling 0£ the

work, and "at one" with it.

Yet, we do not remain passive.

From openness to the £eeling, we proceed to an active
investigation of all the connections within the work,
assessing the relations which bring about the fusion 0£ the
parts into the whole.

In this process of analysis and

Judgement, we re-create what the artist has created:
Everyone is expected to be active in his
relations with a work 0£ art.
For how else can
one sense the tensions, and connections, demands,
fulfillments, satisfactions, and consummation in
an organic integration of the aesthetic materials,
unless one actively enters into them and £eels
with them as the artist did?"C16]
The result 0£ this active re-creation is our discovery of
the work of art embodied by the art obJect we see before
us.

There is a delicate balance between us and the art
obJect in Organicism. We must be active and knowledgeable,

16. Pepper, 1965, p.88.
- 22 -

 in other words, discerning critics.

The work 0£ art should

communicate £eeling through a £used system 0£ right
relations, explaining itsel£ to the perceptive viewer.

I£

either we or the obJect are de£icient, aesthetic experience
will £alter and £ail. (17)
Much 0£ the nature 0£ my own aesthetic experiences
is described in the Organicist theory 0£ aesthetic
Relations and connections seem to colour my

experience.
thought.

Each 0£ the art works I have described, the

Rembrandt painting, the Syperek etching, and the woven
tapestries, seemed to be possessed 0£ a

11

£eeling

11

which I

understood partly through my analysis 0£ the details 0£
these works.

Yet, one aspect remains unexplained: the

culmination 0£ these experiences in a mood or £eeling which
seemed di££erent £ram that I £elt at the beginning.
The suggestion that, through active involvement in
the work, we "£eel" the aesthetic materials "as the artist
did" is open to question.

Is it possible £or us to have a

relationship to the art work akin to that 0£ the artist?

I

had been interested in Rembrandt and his paintings £or many
years be£ore I had the experience with Voung_Girl_at_an_Oeen
Hal£-Door in the Art Institute 0£ Chicago. But Rembrandt had
watched this portrait grow £ram the moment 0£ conception in
his mind.

He knew the challenge, the JOY and despair, 0£

attempting to realize his inner vision.

17. Pepper, 1965, p.89.
- 23 -

His relationship

 with the work was lengthy and complex.

It was £unded by

half" a li£etime 0£ activity as a painter 0£ people.

Can

this subtle interplay 0£ emotion, intellect and operations
be compared to my own experience, even i£ I should yisit the
work many times and spend hours studying Rembrandt's "li£e?
Perhaps the phrase "at one with" holds the solution
to this dilemma.

In Young_Girl_at_an_Oeen_Hal£-Door,

Rembrandt created a £used system 0£ £arms, an organic whole
which possesses £eeling.
also an organic whole.

My experience 0£ the portrait is
Beittel suggests that the Organicist

recognizes:
"
• an almost Zen stance in the present
which allows one to organize wholistically and
qualitatively whatever is being experienced,
thought, or created.
By extension, this
orientation is the same for the one who inquires
into or interprets art making and responding in
art. C18J
In this way, through the very nature 0£ the aesthetic
experience, I am at one with the portrait and £eel with it
as Rembrandt did.
Much 0£ the nature 0£ my own aesthetic experiences
is described in the Organicist theory 0£ aesthetic
experience.
thought.

Relations and connections seem to colour my

Each of the art works I have described--the

Rembrandt painting, the Syperek etching and the woven
tapestries--seemed to be possessed 0£ a "feeling" which I

18. Beittel,

p.53.
- 24 -

 understood partly through my analysis 0£ the details 0£
these works.

In each 0£ these experiences I £elt a unity

between my sel£ and the work 0£ art.

Yet, one aspect

remains unexplained: the culmination 0£ these experiences in
a mood or £eeling which seemed di££erent £ram that which I
£elt at the beginning.

4. Formism

Pepper suggests that the "Root Metaphor" £or this
World View is "Similarity."[19] The Formist recognizes that
a "standard" exists £or each group 0£ entities in the
world.

For example, in the manu£acture 0£ the best

watercolour brushes, only hairs £ram the tail 0£ the
Kolinsky, a member 0£ the weasel £amily, are used.

The

ideal hairs £or such a brush are 2" to 2 1/2" long, but

hairs as short as 1 3/4" are acceptable.

Thus, the hairs

which are selected constitute an "ideal · average.

11

Not all

0£ them meet the requirements 0£ an ideal hair, but each is
close enough that, when assembled and placed in a handle,
they become .. the world's £inest pure red sable water colour
brushes."C20J

Brushes that do not meet the norm £or shape,

handle weight, and balance are discarded through quality

19. A more complete outline 0£ Formism may be £ound in
Pepper, 1942, pp.151-185.
20. "Winsor and Newton's Series 7," Product Folder <London:
Winsor and Newton, 1982), cover.
- 25 -

 control.

Artists apply their own norm when buying

watercolour brushes.
quickly £licked.

The brush is dipped in water and

Only brushes that come to a single-hair

point are considered worthy 0£ purchase.
The Formist World View reflects this procedure of
the application 0£ norms, an activity ; £amiliar to us in our
daily lives.

11

Norm" and "normal" are the "ideal average"

£or a group 0£ entities.
to this norm,

Value derives from close approach

indeed the thrust of Formism is toward

establishing the relationship 0£ entities to norms as a
universal basis £or value Judgement.

This thrust

establishes two branches in Formist aesthetics: one
determines the value of the aesthetic experience in terms of
the norm for man; the other evaluates the art obJect in
terms of the norms particular to art.
Man, in Formist philosophy, is not the everyday
creature we see around us.

He is the ideal average, removed

from time and place, sound in both mind and body.(21]
Formism establishes aesthetic experience as

11

perceptions satisfying in themselves to the normal
man."[22J
stable.

Satisfying perceptions are balanced, whole and
Formists suggest that we suppress much 0£ our

21. Pepper, 1965, p.103, uses the example of medical
examainers choosing draftees in wartime.
Men approaching
the ideal average are selected £or service in the armed
£orces.
22. Pepper, 1965, p.107.
- 26 -

 emotion, destroying the personal balance necessary to a
normal li:fe.

When we look at an art obJect, we 1denti£y

with the characters represented or with the emotion
depicted.

This identi£ication enables us to let out our

supressed impulses, returning us to the normal state . a£
exquilibrium with our environment. (23]

The aesthetic

experience is cathartic.
The norms £or the work o:f art are well-de£ined by
Formism:
The artist sees the universal, the norm,
through the particular, and the beauty 0£ the
representation is in proportion to the degree in
~hich the artist has been able to penetrate to the
universal implicit in the particular.
• The
artist aims £or the essence, the real character 0£
things. (24]
This more universal value, based on representing the
relationship 0£ the particular to the norm, is accompanied
by value resting in norms more speci£ic to art.

The

exemplary work will reflect good design and cra£tsmanship,
and be true to its materials.

It will adhere to the rules

0£ genre and style particular to its time, and reflect
current social mores.

Norms such as these have strongly

in£luenced art movements and art criticism.

"Classic"

periods in art, and criticism which seeks quality o:f
production and reflection 0£ the times in works of art, can
be linked to the Formist viewpoint.

23. Pepper, 1965, pp.108-111.
24. Pepper, 1965, p.105.
-

27 -

 Formism is adequate to the task of establishing
bases for Judgment of the art obJect. but less equipped to
describe the precise nature of our aesthetic experiences.
Much of the content of my own experiences with art l ; es
beyond Formist explanation.

My feelings seem to comprise

more than Just cathartic relief.

When I

look at works like

the Rembrandt. the Syperek. and the tapestries.

I gain

something more than recognition of value accruing from the
norm.
Formism seems to delegate to the viewer the
relatively passive obJective of discovering the norms within
a work of art and of Judging its value accordingly.

Pepper.

attempting to enrich the Formist definition of aesthetic
experience. makes recourse to concepts central to other
World Views . . . Emotionally perceiving'' a work of art. and
then "responding to everything contained in the work"
through .. a series of funded perceptions"[25J

are ideas

prominent in Mechanism. Organicism and Contextualism.
respectively.

The contribution of Formism lies not in

important additions to these ideas. but in setting them
within the circle of normal experience.

25. Pepper. 1965. p.111.
- 28 -

 Conclusion
Pepper suggests that, during our theoretical
investigations, World Hypotheses should not be mixed,
we should be consistent.

i.e.

Mixes 0£ World Hypotheses tend to

distort evidence and give vague results.

Clearer and more

logical findings arise £rem keeping them separate.

In my

overview 0£ aesthetic experience, I have £allowed his
mandate.

But, as Pepper himself admits, a logical

explanation may not be su££icient £or practical purposes.
He recommends:
• a reasonable post rational
eclecticism, a synthesis 0£ these £our rational
Judgments in whatever way our · practical good sense
indicates will make the most 0£ them. C26J
To reiterate, Pepper recognizes that though his
World Hypotheses may be internally consistent, and useful in
our theoretical investigations, our practical lives are more
complex.

Our adhesion to a single World Hypothesis will

result in our overlooking details which may be unimportant
theoretically but central in terms 0£ practical reality.

No

single World Hypothesis possesses the precision, scope, and
adequacy to describe an aesthetic event completely.
Pepper is quite specific in his view of what counts
as an aesthetic experience.

He suggests the £allowing

eclectic definition as a reasonable, though brie£, summary:

26. Pepper, 1965, p.10.
- 29 -

 An experience of beauty is one vivid in
quality, highly organized, and a source of
immediate enJoyment for a normal mind. [27)
Pepper suggests that he has taken the definitional criteria
of one 0£ his four valid World Hypotheses as a £oun9ation,
and then qualified it through the definitional criter~a 0£
the other three.

His statement thus contains the salient

features 0£ each 0£ his £our valid World Views. His choice
0£ the Contextualist's "vivid quality" as the base £or his
definition shows, perhaps, his sympathy £or the
Contextualist postition.
Even when we take into account the details 0£ the
aesthetic experience as outlined ~n our overview 0£ Pepper's
theory, this definition seems vague.
"beauty" requires further explanation.

For example, the term
Does Pepper mean

"beauty" in the Mechanist sense: that which pleases us; or
"beauty" in the Formist sense: adherence to artistic norms?
In addition, we have noted that some art obJects are not
beautiful in the generally accepted sense 0£ the word.

How,

then, can our aesthetic experiences be, first and foremost,
"an experience of beauty"?

Moreover, by "highly organized, ..

does Pepper mean organization which is ordered by the obJect
or controlled by the viewer?

Finally, are our experiences

0£ art always "enJoyable" in the accepted sense 0£ the
word?
For all, then, that Pepper's World Hypothesis Theory

27. Pepper, 1965, pp.140-41.
-

30 -

 has contributed to our understanding 0£ aesthetic
experience, some questions remain.

We have yet to establish

whether the obJects that occasion this experience make up a
special class, di££erent £ram other obJects because . they
embody the personality or intention 0£ the artist, or bear
some unifying characteristic such as "expressiveness,"' or
are extraordinarily coherent, consisent, or whole.

We do

not yet know whether a special way 0£ looking or a special
attitude towards the obJect is required 0£ us as viewers,
and whether our experience is one 0£ heightened sensual,
emotional, or intellectual activity, or some combination 0£
these.

In sum, we have yet to establish whether aesthetic

experience di££ers £ram other experiences in kind or in
degree.

Philosophers have,

in the interest 0£ clarity,

tended to emphasize either the art obJect or the viewer in
their investigations 0£ aesthetic experience.

Though it is

not likely that these can be treated adequately in
isolation, a more specific investigation 0£ each may well
answer some 0£ our questions.

-

31 -

 Chapter Three

THE ART SYMBOL:
SUSANNE LANGER'S THEORY OF EXPRESSIVENESS

Introduction
For my . investigation 0£ the art obJect and 0£ the
spectator, I have chosen the writings 0£ two recent
theorists.

In this way I acknowledge that the term

"aesthetic experience 11 is comparatively new, though the
experience itsel£ may have been born eons ago when man £irst
looked at his own creations with wonder and surprise.

These

two Twentieth Century writers re£lect on art obJects and on
aesthetic experience in ways that are somewhat problematic
in terms 0£ Pepper's overview.

Susanne Langer has, over the

past £orty-£ive years, developed what is probably the most
remarkable aesthetic theory since John Dewey's exposition 0£
"art as experience."

After briefly surveying her theory of

the art obJect~ and outlining her statements on aesthetic
experience, I shall examine that experience in greater
detail through a description 0£ the phenomenological
approach of Mikel Dufrenne.

-

32 -

 The_Theory_o£_Susanne_Langer: __ A_Select_Summary
It is impossible to write about Langer's ideas
without examining the terms that she uses.

Each term which

is important to her theory is assigned a meaning which may
sometimes be at odds with general linguistic usage.

It is

0£ prime importance, there£ore, to recall her particular

meanings as we read her words.
Langer proposes that the work 0£ art is a symbol,
but a symbol 0£ a very special kind.
work 0£ art has meaning.
stands £or something.

Like a symbol, the

It represents, points to, or

But, unlike more £amiliar symbols,

such as the heart or cross, the "art symbol
beyond itsel£ to an exterior meaning.

does not point

11

Neither is it, like

words in language, part 0£ a coded symbol system, with
meanings governed by conventions 0£ use.Cl]

The work 0£ art

bears its meaning within itsel£, it is an unique
sel£-re£erential symbol, or "expressive · £orm.

11

C2J

Meaning

is integral to the work, and is more accurately termed
11

import," £or the work 0£ art may have many

11

meanings," such

as those 0£ representation or subJect matter, which are
indeed exterior.

The art symbol guides our sensibilities

toward recognition 0£ it~ import, the expressiveness which

1. Susanne Langer, Problems_o£_Art:_Ten_PhilosoQhical
k~StY~~§ <New York: Charles Scribner's, 1957), p.67.
2. Langer, 1957, p.67.
-

33 -

 This expressiveness is that of "'human

dwells within it.[3]
:feeling

presented directly to our understanding.

11

11

Human feeling,, .. in Langer's sense,, is £ar more than

mere emotion.
£elt."C4l

It is ...

• everything that can be

It is a complex gathering 0£ the vital processes

o:f life,, many o:f which remain beyond the reach o:f discursive
language. [5)

Human :feeling might be compared to a deep well

with many currents.

The sur:face o:f the well is the level o:f

consciousness,, in psychological terms the limen,, or
threshold o:f consciousness.

Beneath the sur:face flow the

never ceasing currents o:f the tensions and resolutions
within the physiological systems governing bodily £unctions
and :feelings, and within the psychical systems 0£ the
unconscious mind.
environment.

Above the sur:face is the world o:f our

Something as tiny as a mote 0£ dust is capable

o:f disturbing the sur:face 0£ a well,, creating infinitessimal
ripples.

Though the dust originates in the environment, the

rearrangement o:f the molecules o:f water which changes the

3. Langer, 1957, p.127.
In this passage Langer also
suggests the substitution of "expressive £arm" £or "art
symbol.
Since she returns, in the pages that follow, to
the use 0£ "art symbol,," I have continued to use this
original terminology £ound in her earlier book, Feeling_and
EQ~m- It emphasizes an important point, that works 0£ art
have meaning.
11

4. Langer, 1957,, p.15.
5. Langer,, 1957, pp.21-22.
This paragraph is based on
"Expressivesness, 11 Chapter 2 o:f ~~QQl~fil§, especially
pp.21-25, and on Mind:_An_Essa~_on_Human_Feeling,, Vol.1.
(1967; rpt.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1970),, pp.19-32.
-

34 -

 sur£ace is action within the water 0£ the well.

Currents

£ram deep within the water may also rise up to the surface,
creating ripples or waves.

In somewhat the same way, we

£eel changes to our consciousness, tensions and reaolutions
£elt as engendered £rom both above and below the limen of
consciousness.

What Langer terms feeling "£elt as impact"

results from the reaction 0£ our peri~heral sense
mechanisms, especially sight, hearing, and touch, to the
environment, to stimuli £ram without.
from within, as

11

autogenic actions,

11

Feelings registered
are the arising to

conscious thought 0£ currents £rom deep within our well of
£eeling.

We name some of these currents 0£ £eeling, calling

them emotions, thoughts, conceptions, or ideas. [6]

We

express these in written or spoken words, using language as
a more or less linear code.

Other feelings which rise to

the surface remain un-named.
di££icult to express.

These feelings are more

They resist compression into thought;

they remain outside our usual manner 0£ speaking.

They are

what it "£eels like" to love or to hate, to run or to walk,
They are the feelings 0£ being

or to lie in bed thinking.

alive, the fabric of our subJective experience. (7]
express this "inward life"

We

in art; in the metaphoric

language of literature and poetry, in music and drama, and
in painting and sculpture:
Artistic form is congruent with the

6. Langer, 1967, pp.26-28.
7. Langer, 1~57, p.22.
-

35 -

 dynamic forms 0£ our direct sensuous, mental and
emotional li£e; works 0£ art are proJections 0£
"£elt life" as Henry James called it, into
spatial, temporal and poetic structures.
They are
images 0£ £eeling, that £ormulate it for our
cognition. (8]
When we create a work 0£ art, we are guided ~y
£eeling.

An idea will slowly grow within us until we must

express it; or may seem to come upon ~s suddenly, when we
are thinking or doing something else.

Many times we £eel a

necessity to paint, or draw, or sculpt, a need which urges
Langer would suggest that this is a gathering 0£ the

us on.

dynamic £orces within us, an ascending current of £eeling
which bursts through into consciousness and leads us as we
work.

When each brush stroke seems to command the placement

0£ the next, £eeling is at work in us, enabling us to
establish the connections which give our work a kind 0£
organic unity.
We use our artist's tools and materials to create
the image 0£ £elt li£e, the art symbol, the embodiment 0£
£eeling.

The art symbol is not the physical obJect, not

paint and canvas or paper and ink.

It is the expressive

Form which emerges when we lay down our tools, step back and
know that the work is finished. (9)

In this moment, we are

8. Langer, 1957, p.25.
9. The term "£orm 11 may be used in at least two ways when
re£erring to a work 0£ art: first, to re£er to the totality
0£ the work, the unity which expresses £eeling, and second,
to mean the graphic components 0£ the work: lines, shapes,
textures, colours, and so on.
When I intend the £irst
meaning, I shall, from this point, capitalize this word.
See f~EQl~m~, p.30, £or Langer's comment on artistic £arm.
-

36 -

 the first viewer, and the art symbol appears to our
perception.

We see be£ore us what we call a "picture.," that

which Langer calls "the apparition" or "virtual image."

If

we have painted apples, we see an "image" 0£ apples, not
paper and paint, and certainly not real apples.

I£ we have

worked non-obJectively, we see shapes, lines, and colours
interacting in a space.

In both cases, the space in our

work is not real but "virtual," existing only in perception,
realized by the relationships within the work, by the
tensions and resolutions we have created. (10)
We have been led by feeling in creating the art
symbol, the virtual image which holds the import of the
work.

11

Intuition

11

guides our Judgments as we adJust the

£orms and relationships within the work., and our perception
0£ the art symbol in the completed work.

Langer suggests

that intuition is not a mysterious or irrational feeling of
"knowing something," it i s "

• the basic intellectual

act" which binds psychical feelings together and presents
them to cognition. Cll]

Intuition acts when we begin a

sentence, carrying our ideas along beneath our words,
forging the links which bring a logical conclusion.
Intuition is in operation when a paragraph abandons our
outline and begins to "write itsel£."

Intuition links

10. Langer, Feeling_and_Form:_A_Theory_o£_Art_Develo2ed_£rom
Philoso2hy_in_a_New_Key <New York: Charles Scribner~s.,
1953), pp.47,48, and Langer, 1953, pp.28,29.
11. Langer, 1953, p.375.
- 37 -

 intelligence, perception, and £eeling in the intimate and
instantaneous bond we call "sudden insight," "instant
It is at work when we look

recognition," or "bright idea."

at our painting and know instantly that a line must . be
changed or a colour adJusted.

It connects us to our ·

£eelings as we struggle to solve the problem 0£ a di££icult
passage; seeking through Judgment and adJustments 0£
relationships to marry the £orms to the £eeling they must
express.

It is at work in all perceptions 0£ Forms, their

relationships and abstractions.

It underlies our synthesis

0£ parts into wholes or gestalts, and our perception 0£ the
signi£icance 0£ these organic wholes.(12)

Intuition works

within us as artists when we step back to assess our work,
· and within us as viewers, when, in our aesthetic
experiences, we grasp immediately the import 0£ the art
symbol.
In aesthetic experience, the work 0£ art separates
itsel£ from its surroundings, by virtue 0£ the appearance 0£
the virtual obJect to our perception.

In this manner it

removes itsel£ from the meanings and practicalities which
burden common obJects.

We are enabled to give ourselves

completely to the work before us, concentrating our senses
on it alone. (13]

We behold the apparition, and, in our

beholding, respond to it.

The work establishes a direct

12. Langer, 1957, pp.60-69, and Langer, 1953, p.378.
13. Langer, 1953, pp.45-47, and Langer, 1957, pp.28-33.
- 38 -

 relationship with us, revealing its import.

Our intuition

grasps the salient :feeling immediately, presenting it
:forcefully to conaciousness.(14)
Langer suggests that in this experience the work 0£
art "may truly be said to 'do something to us.'"

It

clari£ies and organizes our intuitions 0£ the psychic and
physiological processes 0£ li£e, processes which are
ordinarily experienced as a con£used melange 0£ inarticulate
:feelings, presenting these as sensual £orms, "f'orms 0£
:feeling," to our understanding.
:feeling. C15]

It obJecti:fies subJective

Intuition connects this subJective :feeling,

presented to us through the tensions and resolutions o:f
sensual f'orm, to the physiological and psychical systems
within our bodies.

As we look, our eyes move in unison with

the rhythms and relationships within the work.

The

:feeling-currents within our bodies resonate, establishing
our a:f:finity with the work. [16]

This is "artistic

perception," an act o:f understanding which grants us
knowledge o:f the deep :feeling o:f li:fe, knowledge which we
cannot express in discursive language.
Contemplation :follows the immediate insight o:f

14. Langer, 1953, p.375.
15. Langer, 1953, p.397, and Langer, 1957, pp.22-23 and 26.
16. Langer, 1957, pp.25,26.
Langer does not use the term
"resonate," but this word seems appropriate to her theory.
See, :for instance, ~~QQl~m~ p.34.
Here, she suggests that
we do not "know" the import 0£ the work o:f art, but "£eel"
it.
- 39 -

 intuition.

Langer does not de£ine the term, nor describe

this process in detail.

This seems to be the time during

which our psychic £eelings interact extensively with the
£eelings in .the work, intuition guides our thought~ and a
new mental construct emerges, our own comprehensive
conception 0£ the art symbol.

Our contemplation 0£ the work

generates an emotion in us, not the emotion 0£ the artist,
not f"eeling mediated "through" the work, but an exhilaration
rising f"rom our intuition 0£ import, f"rom our understanding
0£ £eeling "in" the work, and £ram the sympathetic resonance
0£ our bodies.

This, £or Langer, is "the aesthetic

emotion."C17J
Langer concludes her description 0£ aesthetic
experience with the advent 0£ contemplation.

Discursive

reasoning, a requirement £or ref"lection on exterior
meanings, such as subJect matter or the historical and
social signi£icance 0£ the work, and £or analysis, lies
outside her conception 0£ aesthetic experience.

Thinking

about the work 0£ art, gathering together what we know about
it, or analysing the relationships within it, will hamper
our intuitive response. C18J

For Langer, aesthetic

experience consists 0£ two processes only, immediate
intuition 0£ import, and contemplation.
exclude conscious thought.

17. Langer, 1953, p.397.
18. Langer, 1957, pp.397 and 406.
- 40 -

Both of" these

 Langer's explanation 0£ aesthetic experience places
obligations upon both the work 0£ art and the viewer.

The

work must present the virtual image, and, in addition, it
must be an organic unity composed 0£ £orms which express
human £eeling.C19J

We must be responsive.

When we look at

a work 0£ art, we are "beholders."[20) We seem to be
receivers 0£ £eeling, little appears to be required 0£ us.
Yet, in order to receive, we must be responsive, so that the
£eeling 0£ the work may be connected to our own deep
We must be £ree 0£ preconceptions which hinder

f'eelings.

our recognition 0£ the virtual image.

We must avoid the

conscious thought which categorizes the work, analyses it,
or becomes preoccupied with subJect matter.

Conclusion
Despite the £act that her chosen terminology may be
somewhat con£using, Langer's theory 0£ the "art symbol"
makes important contributions to my investigation.
the word

11

symbol

"art symbol

11

11

First,

separates art £rom mere decoration.

conveys meaning.

The

Aesthetic experience is,

there£ore, more than Just hedonistic pleasure.

It is

commerce with meaning as well as sensual enJoyment.

Through

this, value inheres both to our experiences with works 0£

19. Langer, 1957, p.137.
20. Langer, 1953, p.393.
- 41 -

 art, and to the works themselves.

Second, the import 0£ the

art obJect is not established through discursive reasoning,
£or analytic thought is not part 0£ Langer's conception 0£
aesthetic experience.
to intuition.

Meaning must be immediately ~vailable

The art symbol carries connotations 0£

instant comprehension: we do not analyse symbols in order to
understand their meaning.

Third, Langer's theory

establishes that art obJects are a special class 0£
obJects.

They are "expressive." Now, as a descendent 0£ the

verb .. to express," the adJective "expressive" describes the
apt and vigorous a££irmation 0£ emotion or meaning. C21J

As

an "expressive obJect," the art symbol can, there:fore,
embody either or both 0£ these.

Langer explains that the

expression 0£ the art obJect is not empathetic.

It does not

express the artist's actual emotions or £eelinga, but what
he knows about £eelings.

Art obJects unite £eeling and

meaning, £or the £eeling in the art obJect is its meaning •
• the art symbol is the absolute
image--the image of what would otherwise be
irrational, aa it ia literally ine££able: direct
awareness, emotion, vitality, personal
identity--li£e lived and :felt, the matrix 0£
mentality. C22l
This is the attraction 0£ the art obJect, the unique
property which engages our attention.

This is what drew me

to Rembrandt's Young_Girl_at_an_0Een_Hal£-Door.

21. The_Concise_Ox£ord_Dictionary_o£_Current_English,
ed.
1982).
22. Langer, 1957, p.139.

- 42 -

<7th

 These features notwithstanding, Langer 1 s theory is
problematic.

First, the viewer is more or less passive.

In

re£erring to viewers; Langer employs the term "beholder." To
behold is a "passive sensation,

• to receive th.e

impression 0£ (anything) through the eyes." C23J

Yet, · in our

aesthetic experiences we seem to do more that merely
"receive impressions."
much mental activity.

My own experiences seem to involve
Langer hersel£ writes 0£ the "impact"

0£ works 0£ art, but she suggests that in absorbing this
impact the viewer is no more than receptive.

When I looked

at Young_Girl_at_an_OQen_Half-Door, was I an open vessel
into which feeling was poured?

Second, a complete aesthetic

experience seems to consist 0£ more than "intuition" and
"contemplation." Intellectual thought was part 0£ my
experience with Young_Girl_at_an_02en_Hal£-D0or £or my
re£ection included analysis.

Contemplation, there£ore,

appears an inadequate term £or the level 0£ experience which
£allows intuition.

Third, a gul£ seems to exist between the

viewer and the work.

The art obJect and the viewer are each

autonomous entities, Joined by a narrow bridge, the
intuition 0£ £eeling.

This seems a tenuous union to me, one

which is inadequate to describe my relationship with

I~~

Young_Girl_at_an_02en_Hal£-D0or. Can I £ind a more adequate
description 0£ this relationship?

23. Concise_Ox£ord_Dictionari

- 43 -

 Chapter Four

MIKEL DUFRENNE:

A SCHEMA FOR AESTHETIC EXPERIENCING

Introduction
Be£ore proceeding to outline Mikel Du£renne's theory
0£ aesthetic experience, we must understand the meaning 0£
"phenomenology" as a branch 0£ philosophical investigation.
Phenomenology is, as the word suggests, the study 0£ the
world through interpretation 0£ its phenomena: the study 0£
things presented directly to our senses in "lived
experience, 11 experience as we live it.

Through care:ful

description, engendered by a re£lection £ree 0£ theoretical
doctrine, the phenomenologist seeks underlying "meaning":
the .. essence" which he believes to lie within phenomena and
to constitute the ground o:f our understanding.

Things are

not always what they appear.

I am sitting at my desk, reading, writing, and
thinkins.

The window beside me is open.

Throu9h it drift

sounds o:f the hot summer a£ternoon: small voices 0£ children
at play in the sandbox next door; sharp cadence of
tree-:frogs in the birches; lazy twitter o:f birds.
calls "Catherine, Catherine!
over here!"

11

Another answers,

11

A voice

They"re both

The pattern o:f sounds resumes.

I, the silent listener, muse, connecting this
- 44 -

 six-word exchange to the subJect 0£ my previous thoughts:
Phenomenology. These words, which interrupt the £low of the
afternoon, are a phenomenon, a £ragment of the "life-world"
in which I am involved, individually, through the conscious
activity of my listening and my thought.
How can the call "Catherine! 11 bring forth the answer
"They're both here!"

A single child has been called, but

the child has not answered.

An adult has answered, knowing

the meaning of the calling of one child, yet answering on
behalf of two.

And the one who called is satisfied, though

the answer, on the surface, is nonsense.
Wherein lies the meaning of this short exchange?
How is it that two adults can find truth in what appears as
nonsense?

I write two sentences: "The meaning was not in

the calling but behind it."

and, "She understands the

meaning because of culture and previous experience."
what meaning am I referring?

But to

We shall discover it through

more detailed description, and reflection. Cl]
In the hot afternoon, the children play quietly in
the sandbox.

A mother, within her house, begins to think

about her child, whom she has not seen for a little while.
A small concern arises within her head and her heart: "Where

1. Ideas in this section derive from two essays in N~~
Essays_in_Phenomenology:_Studies_in_the_Philoso~hy_of
Ex2erience, ed.
James M. Edie <Chicago: Quadrangle Books,
1969); Stephen A. Erickson, "Language and Meaning," pp.
39-49, and Cyril Welch, "Speaking and Bespeaking, .. pp.
72-82.
- 45 -

 is my child?"

She is not overly anxious; it is a quiet
She steps outside

street and there are many £riends nearby.

She does not call "Catherine, where are you?"

and calls.

or "Catherine, answer because I have not seen you £or a
little while!"

She knows the name holds her meaning .'

The one who hears the name is also a mother.

She

sits in the sunshine, watching the children at their play.
She recognizes her neighbour's voice, and £ram past
experience, knows the meaning behind the words.

She answers

her neighbour's small concern and adds £urther in£ormation.
Cheer£ully, she sends the message "Catherine is here.,
playing with my son."

The pattern 0£ the a£ternoon

resumes.
But, how is it that I have been distracted £ram my
work?

Why have I attended to this interlude?

I have not

intentionally involved mysel£ in other exchanges which I
dimly register as taking place between the mothers and their
children.

Is it not because my name is Katherine and the

calling conJured up the love and concern 0£ my own mother?
Is it not because I am a mother who, in times past, had this
small concern and called?
mind seeks an example 0£
experience"?
0£ my name.

Is it not, as well, because my
11

essence.,

11

0£

11

meaning hidden in

My attention has been awakened by the calling
My conscious thought adds extra layers 0£

import to this exchange between neighbours.
reveals the "essence" 0£ the phenomenon.
can be all mothers as well as one mother.
- 46 -

My re£lection

The one who calls
The one who

 answers could be all neighbours as well as this neighbour.
The essence 0£ the calling is akin to love, and to concern.
The essence 0£ the answering is a kind 0£ neighbourliness.
It seems odd to suggest that we may use this example
to Justi£y a phenomenological study 0£ aesthetic
experience.Yet, both this exchange between two suburban
housewives, and our experiences with works 0£ art, are
phenomena.

Both may be examined and interpreted

phenomenologically.

I£ it is possible to reveal essence in
-----

a slight exchange 0£ words, surely a phenomenological study
0£ aesthetic experience will reveal meanings other than
those derived £ram analytical de£inition.
Our investigations 0£ the aesth~tic experience have
been centered on the e££orts 0£ philosophers to make
obJective statements about an experience available to us as
individuals.

We have included in our account some ideas

which, over time, have appeared central to any general
consideration 0£ aesthetic experience.

In the sense that we

have selected certain perspectives and authors, our choice
may be regarded as somewhat arbitrary.

Phenomenology moves

us £ram broad considerations 0£ man in general towards
cognizance 0£ individual being.

The attempt to reveal the

essence 0£ our aesthetic experience through phenomenological
description holds promise 0£ a base £ram which we may
re-survey our previous £indings.

-

47 -

 A_Theory_of_Aesthetic_Ex2erience.
As a phenomenologist, Mikel Dufrenne seeks to
uncover, through description and interpretation, the meaning
0£ aesthetic experience, the essence 0£ this event, t ~ e

11

x

£actor" which marks our perceptions of art obJects as
di££erent £ram our perceptions 0£ everyday obJects.

He

reveals the special nature 0£ aesthetic experience through
describing the relations between the artist, the art obJect,
and the spectator.

He moves toward providing a model which

shows how we gain access to import, the £elt-li£e which
Langer suggests the art obJect presents to our perception.
It is impossible to gain a sense 0£ his theory without
considering the levels of experience he discerns within the
aesthetic event.

Let us, therefore, examine these levels.

Where clarification is necessary, I shall link these to my
experience with Rembrandt's Young_Girl_at_an_02en_Hal£-D0or.

Presence
Within aesthetic experience, the art obJect calls to us and
we answer.

Irresistibly, it draws us toward its self, and

we enter its unique world by helping to constitute that
world.

It needs us.

It is completed only when we gaze upon

it.
In Presence, I begin understanding the art obJect
through my body: ''As living and as mine~ the body itself is
capable 0£ knowledge, and this £act represents a scandal
- 48 -

 only £or those who consider the obJective rather than the
animated body.

11

(2)

The body is not a shell occupied by a

mind which comprehends through assembling images 0£
"reality" re£lected in the brain like little pictures.

As

Merleau Ponty suggests,
One does not construct perception as one
does a house: by assembling the material gotten
£ram the senses and the material . gotten £ram
memory; one does not explain it as an event of
nature by situating it at the con£luence 0£
several causal aeriea--aenaory mechanisms and
mnemonic mechanisms .
. The act 0£ knowing is not of the
order of events; it is a taking possession of
events, even internal ones, which is not mingled
with them; it is always an internal 're-creation'
of the mental image and, as Kant and Plato have
said, a recognizance, a recognition.
It is not
the eye, not the brain, but no more is it the
'psychism' 0£ the psychologist which can
accomplish the act 0£ vision.
It is a question 0£
an inspection of the mind in which events are
known in their meaning at the same time as they
are lived in their reality.[3]
The dawning 0£ understanding in Helen Keller, the
dea£-mute, is illuminating.

Her teacher continually

"spelled" words into her hand, but it was af'ter breaking a
Jug £illed with water, being £arced to refill it at the
well, and £eeling the water running over her hand while her
teacher spelled the word that the connection between "thing

2. Mikel Du£renne, The_Phenomenology_o£_Aesthetic
Ex2erience, trans.
Edward S. Casey, Albert A.Anderson,
Willis Domingo, Leon Jacobson <Evanston: Northwestern
Univsersity Press, 1973),p.337.
3. Alden L. Fisher, ed., The_Essential_Writings_of_Merleau
<New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1969.) "The
Relations of' the Soul and the Body and the Problem of
Perceptual Consciousness," p.153.

fQ!:!!:Y

- 49 -

 Only the intelligent body

water 11 and "word water" was made.

could have accomplished this, for this child could neither
She could not visualize.

see nor hear.
She could not

11

She knew no words.

th ink" in what we consider the usual. ways.

I did not use my usual mode of thinking in my first
glance at Young_Girl_at_an_02en_Hal£-Door. My body resonated
with excitement.

A fascination,

stirred by my recognition

I was drawn to the work.

of Presence, overwhelmed me.
attention was riveted upon it.

My

In a way impossible to

describe, I seemed to understand all about the painting.

I

identified, without thinking, the golden tones and rounded
forms of the young woman.

I did not have to read the label,

think, or analyse to realize that this portrait was by
My body

Rembrandt, and that it held import £or me.

resonated to that import, the meaning 0£ the work.
moved by it. C4J

I was

My later reflection on the work was an

attempt to unravel what I had learned in this first
perception.
It is important to note that when we speak of
Presence we do not mean the emotive symptom, the pulse of
excitement, the .. wow" that we £eel on first seeing a work 0£
art, though this emotive symptom may herald the newly
resonating consciousness which is Presence. Presence is our
experience of grasping the work through the body.

This is

4. Du£renne, pp.336-37.
I take Du£renne 1 s term "meaning" to
be roughly equivalent to Langer's
import.
11

-

50 -

11

 the necessary £irst step in aesthetic experience, £or

11

The

aesthetic obJect is above all the apotheosis 0£ the
sensuous, and all its meaning is given in the sensuous.

11

(5]

Unless our understanding 0£ the art work begins through our
senses, we never really make contact with it.
In Presence, we experience the obJect in the
present, in a moment in which there is no past and no
£uture, but only the now 0£ the lived-obJect.

Yet, the body

alone is not su££icient to complete aesthetic experience £or
.. on the plane 0£ presence,. everything is given, nothing is
known ... (6]

I£ we remain in Presence,. we understand only a

minimally organized,. raw conglomeration 0£ sensations
similar to Langer 1 s notion 0£ £eeling.

Our understanding 0£

the work does not constitute knowledge in the traditional
sense 0£ cognitive,. organized in£ormation.

We know that we

are in touch with an obJect 0£ signi£icance,. but we do not
know the nature 0£ that signi£icance.

We must, there£ore,

move out 0£ Presence, bidding that conscious thought assist
us in completing our understanding 0£ the obJect be£ore us.
We must move £ram "lived knowledge'" to '"thought knowledge."

Re£lection in Aesthetic Experience
Aesthetic perception now di££erentiates itael£ £ram ordinary
perception.

Ordinary perception moves us to action: I see a

5. Du£renne, p.339.
6. Du£renne, p.338.
-

51 -

 chair and sit on it, or move it, or clean it, or stop
looking at it and look at something else.

In aesthetic

perception, Presence entices us into Reflection. How is i t
that we pass from Presence into Reflection? What ca.pacity of
mind, triggered by the art work, moves us from bodily
feeling into conscious thought?

Like Langer, Dufrenne needs

to link raw sensation and conscious mind.
"imagination .. is this link.

He proposes that

Like Langer's notion 0£

"intuition, 11 imagination connects bodily sensation and mind,
organizing the melange 0£ raw perception.
acts as more than a mere connector.

But, imagination

It animates

consciousness into a detailed investigation of our
perceptions.
Dufrenne distinguishes two aspects of imagination:
the transcendental and the empirical.
imagination transcends the physical.

Transcendental
It organizes the raw

sensations of Presence, bringing our perception 0£ the
obJect into focus.

Thus,

imagination approximates to

intuition, but Du£renne makes a further stipulation, a
recommendation foreign to Langer's view of aesthetic
experience.

He bids us use our minds in reflection.

must employ empirical imagination, to organize".

We
. modes

0£ implicit knowledge inherited from the experience 0£
and to bring our funded knowledge to the

presence.

11

obJect.

Empirical imagination presents to mind all that we

C7J

7. Dufrenne, p.351.
- 52 -

 know about the art obJect, the artist,

techniques,

materials, composition, indeed, the compendium of facts
amassed over time by the committed viewer.

Empirical

imagination supports critical analysis in reflection.
At this point, Dufrenne's theory extends beyond that
of Langer. Reflection must be more than Langer's pre-verbal
contemplation of the art obJect, though it may include
this.

It is, for Dufrenne, a discursive operation of mind,

in which our intelligence, knowledge, and sensibility
investigate the art obJect or interact in dialogue with the
work 0£ art, building toward a new relationship with the
work.
Dufrenne discerns two kinds of Reflection: the
"structural," an analysis supported by empirical imagination
and governed by the viewer; and the "sympathetic," a
dialogue initiated by the work 0£ art.

Structural

Reflection moves us toward more detailed knowledge of the
content of the work through the animation of our funded
knowledge.

In looking at Young_Girl_at_an_Oeen_Half-Door, I

admired the brush strokes and established what they
delineated.

I noted the placement 0£ the necklace, and the

re-painting of the line of the arm.

Each of these I

assessed in light 0£ my knowledge of technique and
composition.

I might also have paid attention to the

curving ovals of the composition, deciding that these
contributed to the work's atmosphere of contemplative calm.
I read the label, and this drew me to £it the painting into
-

53 -

 my knowledge 0£ Rembrandt's oevre, and to make connections

with other paintings done during the same period.

I also

compared the painting to others in the gallery, both by
Rembrandt and by other artists.

I sought through this to

establish the signi£icance 0£ the art obJect through ·
discursive thought.

In sum,

I engaged in what is termed

"critical analysis."
Structural re£lection is, £or Dufrenne, an integral
part of our aesthetic experiences.

Even though we have

known the expressiveness 0£ the obJect immediately, in
Presence, our understanding 0£ that expressiveness is likely
to be nebulous and confused.

The work 0£ art is usually too

complex £or decoding by the body to be suf£icient £or our
realization 0£ its meaning.

As we emerge from Presence, the

obJect must be represented to us through discursive
thought.
The body must £ind modes of access to the
obJect before it can recognize and accomodate
itself to the obJect.
The obJect must be
decomposed, points of reference sought out, its
themes and articulations highlighted--£inally an
order must appear and a structure emerge from the
heart of the initial con£usion.
In other words,
the body must be shown how the work was
constructed--not in terms 0£ the actual act 0£
composition.
. but, rather, in terms of its
perfected state. (8]
Yet, structural reflection is not su££icient to
complete our aesthetic experiences.

This kind 0£ re£lection

and its concomitant, critical analysis, is not adequate to

8 ·. Dufrenne,

p. 419.
-

54 -

 the total understanding 0£ the art work.

It attempts to

voice the meaning of the art work in discursive language, to
translate the work 0£ art literally, into "thing,, 11 but "this
undertaking is ultimately £utile,, since what is said by the
work can be said in no other way."[9]

The art obJect is

more than mere "thing ... When we regard it as such, we do not
grant the obJect its Just due, and we lose touch with its
essential nature, its expressiveness.

In attempting to

de£ine the obJect through discursive thought alone, we move
ourselves out 0£ the world of the aesthetic into ordinary
perception.
Reflection must be reoriented in order to
regain the obJect--an obJect which must be
accorded anew the essential privilege 0£ sufficing
by itsel£ and of bearing its meaning within
i tsel£ ..
C10]
How is it that we pass from a reflection in which we
reconstruct the art obJect through our own will,, into a
re£lection in which we may again make contact with the work
of art?

We face the fact that discursive reasoning cannot

adequately explain what is before us, that here are deeps
which language cannot probe.

Through the depths in our own

being,, we recognize the power of the work of art.
ourselves at risk.

We put

A contemplative calm enfolds us,

assisting our progression into sympathetic reflection, and
supporting a new depth in our thinking.

9. Du£renne, p.391.
10. Dufrenne,

p.392.
- 55 -

We allow the art

 obJect to guide our thought, and through this, which is akin
to saying "I follow!"
work of art.

we re-enter the inner world of the

In sympathetic re£lection we submit ourselves

to the work of art.

Discursive thought may continue, but we

refer everything we think back to the work itself, allowing
it to show us how it has become itself, letting its meaning
grow within us.

Our questions are

11
•

• no longer answered

through the discovery of a cause external to the work but
through the feeling of a necessity internal to the
work."Clll
In structural re£lection, analysis extends and
clarifies our perception of the art obJect.

In sympathetic

reflection, the sharpness 0£ analytic thought is mollified
by the advent of a dialogue between ourselves and the art
work.

The content of our _thinking may be the same, but our

attitude toward the work has changed.

We bring to it a

deference and respect, a sensitivity akin to that we £eel
toward a valued friend.
As I

stepped back from Young_Girl_at_an_02en

Half-Door, I moved into sympathetic reflection.

I faced the

£act that the power of the painting was, in some ways,
inexplicable.

I allowed my eye to •xplore the composition,

delighting in the contrast between the many ovals in the
figure and the straight lines of the door, between the rich
darks and luminous lights.

I followed lines and encompassed

11. Dufrenne, p.395.
-

56 -

 shapes, diving . into depths, roving across heights,
the necessity 0£ each brush stroke., not asking
analysing
as "thing

11

11

11

I thought

Why?

11

or

What?" but saying "Yes." I knew the painting not
or "painting" but in a way similar to Presence.

Sympathetic re£lection triggers an oscillation
between discursive thought and the ac~nowlegement 0£
Presence. Our tendency to oscillate involves an interaction
between our intellectual capacities and the a££ective
content 0£ the work 0£ art: the "meaning" which we
understood dimly in Presence and which has been clari£ied
through Re£lection. This oscillation constitutes Du£renne's
third level in aesthetic experience: the level 0£ "£eeling."

Feeling
Both Langer and Du£renne use the word "£eeling," but £or
each, this word holds di££erent meaning.

Langer explains

how the art obJect organizes "£elt-li£e" and presents it to
our perception.

For Langer, these deep £eelings., which can

only be expressed through art, are the import a£ the work of'
art.

Import reaches us directly, through the sympathetic

resonance 0£ our physiological and psychical systems.

In

our £irst moment with the work, we know all it can mean to
us.

Reflection and analysis will not add to this

fundamental knowledge.
Duf'renne reveals that our £iret moment with the work
0£ art is but the beginning 0£ aesthetic experience.
-

57 -

In

 Presence we are convinced of immanent meaning.

This

meaning, the expressiveness of the work, will not be truly
known to us until we have examined the work through
reflection, :for ··.

• reflection prepares the way .:for and

then clarifies feeling.·· C12]

We must experience the ' work

with our whole .. self .. : physically, intellectually, and
emotionally, in order to comprehend it completely.

It is

the oscillation between reflection and feeling, between the
intelligence of mind and the intelligence of body, which
grants us more complete comprehension of the work of art.
In a complete aesthetic experience the art obJect
invites us to swim beneath the surface of the well of
feeling, and to plumb its depths.

··Feeling,·· for Du:frenne,

is .. being-in-depth.·· (13] The feeling in which we participate
as the culmination o:f our aesthetic experiences constitutes
a special relationship between our being and that of the
work of art.

We may understand this as Martin Buber's

I-Thou relationship in which we do not possess other
persons, but are at one with them.[14]

It is, for Du:frenne,

the essence of aesthetic experience, marking this experience
as different in kind from ordinary experience.

12. Dufrenne, p.423.
13. Dufrenne, p.398.
14. Martin Buber, I_and_Thou, trans.
Walter Kaufman <New
York: Charles Scribner's, trans.
copyright 1970), pp.53-55,
and 60-61.
-

58 -

 Langer_and_Dufrenne: __ Com2atible_Theories?
Langer and Dufrenne agree that the art obJect is,
first and foremost, expressive.

Dufrenne emphasizes that we

derive meaning from works of art which cannot be expiained
in discursive language.

Langer talks of import, which she

explains as akin to meaning.[15J

Dufrenne seems to want us

to examine meaning in feeling, whereas Langer seems almost
to regard feeling as meaning.

Feeling, for Dufrenne, is the

culminating level of aesthetic experience.

For Langer it is

the reservoir from which aesthetic experience may spring.
But, though the terminology is different, their theories
still seem compatible.

Both Langer and Dufrenne want to

stress that art works give us knowledge; that this knowledge
is expressed, not simply communicated; and that since such
knowledge is not nameable in language, it can be given to us
on no other way.
In relation to the aesthetic experience, certainly,
Dufrenne's model of the three levels of Presence~ Reflection
and Feeling is further developed than Langer's general ideas
of intuition and contemplation.

Even so, we may discern

something akin to Dufrenne's level of Presence in Langer's
idea of "'impact."' By adressing himself rigorously to the
nature of the relationship between intellect and feeling,
Dufrenne extends Langer's theory of aesthetic experience.

15. Langer, 1957, p.127.
-

59 -

 A detailed investigation 0£ the ideas of these two
philosophers would uncover more di££erences between them,
despite the apparent compatibility 0£ the main features of
their theories.

In general terms, Langer's approach tends

to be epistemological.

She investigates, for example,

£eeling as knowledge, virtuality, and the status 0£
intuitive knowing.

Probably because she deals with the

logical geography of art, her writing style tends toward the
analytic.

She de£ines, rather than simply describes, both

art obJects and art experience.
an ontology of art.

Du£renne develops more 0£

He reveals the "being" of works of art

by describing the nature of our relationships with them.
His efforts to describe our commerce with what is new and
unnameable render his writing more metaphoric and
atmospheric.

His meaning often lies beneath or between his

words, Just as the meaning of a painting may lie beyond the
paint and canvas.
The compatibility of the main features in the
aesthetic theories of these two philosophers suggests a
similarity in their world view.

A detailed examination of

this similarity lies beyond the scope of this thesis.

We

may, however, briefly note that both seem to ground human
understanding in the realm of the pre-verbal, Dufrenne in
the intelligent body, and Langer in £elt-life; and to view
the world as a circular relationship of subJect and obJect,
united and yet autonomous in experience.

This has

ramifications for Pepper's World Hypothesis Theory, for if

-

60 -

 his theory is adequate, surely we should find this approach
compatible with one 0£ his £our valid World Views.
Contextualism and Organicism seem to reflect something 0£
this interpretation.

Yet, close examination 0£ these World

Hypotheses reveals a basic variance £rom the approach of
Du£renne and Langer. Both 0£ these views assault the
autonomy of entities in experience: Contextualism through
the emphasis on £lux and change which denies enduring
characteristics, and Organicism through the fusion 0£
entities in experience.

It may be that the approach to

evidence exempli£ied by Langer and Du£renne is a new
addition to the valid World Views, in which the world is
viewed as a complex of relationships between autonomous
entities.

Meaning is discovered through investigating the

nature 0£ this relationship.

Conclusion
It is important to . note that Dufrenne's schema of
the aesthetic experience outlines a deepening 0£ our
relationship with the work of art, not a string of isolated
occurences which always take place in the same order and in
the same way. (16]

In my own aesthetic experiences, I

discern Presence, Reflection, and Feeling, though isolating
these is sometimes difficult.

Each experience has its own

16. Dufrenne, p.333.
- 61 -

 unique topology.

The di££erences between my experiences

could be the result 0£ variations in the oscillation between
Presence and Feeling, or in the strength 0£ Presence, or in
the part played by Structural versus Sympathetic Reflection.
We must remember, as well, that Du£renne delineates the
ultimate in aesthetic experience.

Within the circle 0£ this

experience a certain variety may be recognized, i£ only
because 0£ the individuality 0£ both viewers and works 0£
art.

Similar variety may be discerned in the details 0£

that other relationship 0£ £eeling, the relationship between
persons.
Du£renne'~ level 0£ Feeling closes the gap between
the viewer and the art obJect.

Both are still autonomous,

yet they are enciosed in an intimate relationship to which
each makes a contribution.

As spectators we bring
We must employ ouselves

everything we know to the work.

completely in our discovery 0£ its expressiveness.

We must

prepare the depths 0£ our own being, so ·that we may reach
the depth 0£ the work 0£ art.
world 0£ the work.

We must risk entering the

For its part, the art obJect must o££er

its meaning to us, not as a riddle to be solved, but as a
treasure to be celebrated.

-

62 -

 Chapter Five

THE AESTHETIC ATTITUDE,
A FOUNDATION FOR AESTHETIC EXPERIENCING

Introduction
We must now gather together our findings about the
aesthetic experience, to ascertain which questions remain
unanswered and to suggest such conclusions as may be drawn
from what is, admittedly, a rather brief survey 0£ one
portion of the field 0£ aesthetics.

Our overview 0£

Pepper's World Hypothesis theory outlined only the general
approaches 0£ philosophers to the aesthetic experience.
This £ocussed our attention on significant questions such as
whether art obJects are members 0£ a special class 0£
obJects, and whether our aesthetic experiences may be
classified as sensual, emotional, intellectual, or a
combination 0£ these.

Our queries appeared to cluster

around a central question: whether aesthetic experiences
di:ffer from other experiences in degree or in kind.
Our more specific examination of the theories of
Langer and Dufrenne established a consistent approach to
some 0£ the problems posed by Pepper's outline.

Both Langer

and Dufrenne view art obJects as autonomous entities,
organic wholes with integral meaning.
-

63 -

Langer's theory

 supports the conclusion that art obJects are members 0£ a
special class 0£ obJects.

They are unique because they show

£orth or symbolize human £eeling, organizing this, rendering
it coherent and available to our understanding.

Du£renne

shows how, as spectators,, we remain autonomous, as a ~esult
0£ our £unded knowledge and experience, yet under the spell
0£ the the work 0£ art.

Within the level 0£ Feeling, we now

recognize that this experience is 0£ a di££erent kind, an
experience in which sensual, intellectual and emotional
activity are £used.

However, we have yet to establish how

we come to have this experience.
us, or do we make it happen?

Does it simply happen to

More specifically, should we

assume a special manner 0£ looking, or a special attitude
toward art obJects?

The_Aesthetic_Attitude
Some theorists suggest that a speci£ically aesthetic
attitude, assumed by the spectator in looking at works 0£
art, is a central aspect 0£ aesthetic experience.

This

attitude has been variously described as .. disinterested
attention,, .. or "psychical distance."

The £irt term dates

back at least to Kant, and the second to Bullough.ClJ

1. Immanuel Kant, The_Critigue_o£_Judgement, trans.
J.H~Bernard (1951; {rpt. New} York: Ha£ner, 1974), pp.38-39,,
45. Edward Bullough, "Psychical Distance,," British_Journal
o£_Psychology, 5 (1913), in A_Modern_Book_o£_Esthetics, ed.
Melvin Rader (4th ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart,, Winston,
1973), pp.368-384.
- 64 -

 "Disinterested attention" is., essentially.., the
contemplation 0£ the ob3ect £or its own sake.

It is o£ten

described as:
. a state 0£ mind in which we are
absorbed in the obJect presented, in becoming
£ully and completely aware 0£ the obJect itsel£
without being de£lected by concern £or its
practical and utilitarian implic~tions.''(21
Edward Bullough coined the term "psychical distance"
in 1913. He suggested that a certain emotional distance is
obtained through".

. separating the <art) obJect and its

appeal £rem one's own sel£."(3J

He contended that such

psychical distance is necessary £or the contemplation 0£ the
art obJect, and is one 0£ the essential characteristics 0£
the aesthetic consciousness.

We must be sympathetic to the

work in order to appreciate it., but i£ we are too
emotionally involved we risk losing the requisite distance.
A spectator who., while looking at a painting 0£ a storm at
sea., remembers being in a similar situation and begins to
re-live the £ear and distress.,
.. under-distanced.

11

looses distance or becomes

According to Bullough., the ideal

situation is the".

• utmost decrease 0£ Distance without

its disappearance."[4J
Paradox clouds the meaning 0£ these notions 0£

2. Harold Osborne, Aesthetics_and_Art_Theory:_An_Historical
Introduction <New York: E. P. Dutton, 1970)., p.154.
3. Bullough, in Rader, p.371.
4. Bullough, in Rader., p.373.
- 65 -

 disinterestedness and distance.

Though we may '"distance"

the art obJect through separating it from purely personal
emotion or meanings, our attitude to the work is not one 0£
impersonal detachment.

Indeed, some theorists have ,

suggested that in aesthetic viewing, we become "at one" with
the work 0£ art.
distance.

Such a phrase suggests the total loss 0£

When I am moved to tears by a particularly

powerful work,

is this a case 0£ "utmost decrease without

disappearance," or am I merely being over emotional - i.e.
am I "under-distancing"?
Both these concepts address the nature and degree of
our attention to the art obJect and are, therefore,
related.

A disinterested attitude is unbiased and open.

It

banishes from our mind those pre-conceived ideas and
opinions which prevent us from absorbing the unique meaning

0£ the work.

Psychical distance assists our open attitude

by controlling both our raw emotions on the one hand, and
our intellectual monopolizing 0£ the work on the other.

The

two concepts are, in a sense, inter-dependent.
There are philosophers who discount the existence of
any special attitude necessary· to the appreciation 0£ works
of art. (5]

They suggest that notions 0£ "disinterestedness"

5. George Dickie,"The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude,"
American_Philoso2hical_Quarterly, 1 (1964), pp.55-65, in ~~t
and_Philoso~hy:_Readings_in_Aesthetica, ed.
W.E. Kennick
(2nd.ed.; New York: St.Martin's Presa, 1979), pp.440-455.
and Francis Sparshott, The_Theory_of_the_Arts <Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1982), pp.470,471.
- 66 -

 and

11

distanc:e

11

are misleading, contending that we do not

need, nor do we take up, any special attitude when viewing
works of art.

In our aesthetic: experiences we merely pay

close attention to . the art obJect.

But, when I remove the

back of my watch and pay close attention to all the cogs,
springs, and wheels, am I having an aesthetic experience?
And when I pay close attention to a painting in order to
choose a frame £or it, is my experience the same as when I
later enJoy it hanging upon my wall?
This idea of distance or attitude seems central to
any interpretation of aesthetic experience.

We can proJect

how Pepper's World Views would accomodate the notion.

For

example, the Mechanist's definition of art obJects as
• things liked or disliked £or themselves" may appear
to support the notion of disinterested attention. [6]

On the

other hand, the catharsis theory in Formism emphasizes our
identification with the art obJect, and thus seems in
opposition to both psychical distance and disinterest. (7]
Pepper, writing about the Contextualist view of aesthetic
experience, supports the notion of psychical distance in his
chapter on "Emotion." Though he denies the existence of a
specifically aesthetic emotion, he admits that we must
control our feelings when viewing works of art.

Both

excessive involvement with the emotional content of a work

6. Pepper, 1965, p.44.
7. Pepper, 1965, p.111.
-

67 -

 and excessive distance lessen our appreciation.

11

A certain

balance 0£ emotional £usion and analytic discrimination is
the normal aesthetic experience.

11

C8J

Bernard Bosanquet,

classi£ied as an Organicist by Pepper, de£ines the aesthetic
attitude as the valuing 0£ an obJect solely £or itsel~.

It

is, in his opinion, an integral part 0£ the aesthetic
experience. C9J

We may conclude that the idea 0£ an

aesthetic attitude appears in the maJority 0£ Pepper's £our
valid World Hypotheses.
Langer seems to deny the existence 0£ a speci£ically
aesthetic attitude.

She is at odds with those who suggest

that we must assume a rari£ied mode 0£ attention when we
look at works 0£ art. ClOJ
appreciation 0£ art .

Yet, she states that

11

All

. requires a certain detachment

which has been variously called the 'attitude 0£
contemplation.,' the 'aesthetic attitude,' or the
'obJectivity' 0£ the beholder.

11

Cl1J

Despite her early

assertion that there is no special attitude assumed by the
viewer, Langer appears to be supporting what has come to be

called "psychical distance."

What she suggests is that

while there is no peculiar and rari£ied attitude we must

8. Stephen Pepper, Aesthetic_Ouality:_A_Contextualistic
Theory_of_Beauty (1937; rpt.
Westport, Conn.: Greenwood.,
1970)., p.106.
See pp.98-109 £or Pepper's complete outline.
9. Bernard Bosanquet,Three_Lectures_on_Aesthetic (1915;
rpt.
New York: Bobbs-Merrill., Cn.d.J), pp.5-21.
10. Langer, 1953, pp.36-38.
11. Langer, 1953, p.318.
- 68 -

 assume be£ore we open the door 0£ an art gallery, an
attitude develops as we look at the works we £ind inside.
Moreover, the artist must make sure that his work elicits
this attitude £ram the beholder, rather than requiring the

.

• percipient to bring an ideal £rame 0£ mind wi t "h

him."(12]

Langer believes that the idea 0£ psychical

distance is especially use£ul in describing this attention
because it admits 0£ degrees whereas

11

•

'obJectivity,'

'detachment' and 'attitudes' are complete or incomplete,
i.e.per£ect or imper£ect.

11

Cl3J

When we recall that one 0£

her basic ideas is the appearance 0£ the "virtual image"
through the detachment 0£ the art obJect £ram its
surroundings, we recognize that the aesthetic attitude,
which discounts those surroundings,

is an important £eature

0£ Langer's theory.
Mikel Du£renne seems to include both psychical
distance and the disinterested attitude in his description
0£ aesthetic experience.

For him, the aesthetic attitude is

£ound in our special relationship with the work 0£ art,
Feeling.

11

in

It is a sort 0£ perpetual oscillation between what

could be called the critical attitude and the attitude 0£
£eeling."Cl4J

This attitude involves us in the work.

We

submit ourselves to it, enter its world, and in so doing,

12. Langer, 1953, pp.318 and 45.
13. Langer, 1953, p.319.
14. Du£renne, p.416.
- 69 -

 abandon the domain of action.

We understand the work from

the inside, in the same way, Du£renne suggests, that we know
a play through our involvement with the characters and their
relationships, an involvement which is personal, y~t denies
identification with them. C15J

Dufrenne seems to be

describing the "utmost decrease 0£ distance without its
disappearance."

Like Langer, he assigns much 0£ the

responsibility £or this distance to the art obJect.

As

spectators, we must play the game and take the role the work
assigns to us. (16] We must approach the art obJect in an
open, unbiased and accepting manner, allowing ourselves to
be moved by it, submitting our consciousness to it.

We are

separated from the phenomenal world, and in this separation
become "disinterested" in our attention.

We are thus

enabled to contemplate the art obJect £or itself alone.

Our

sympathetic, open attitude allows the work to control our
This attitude is the basis for the advent of what

thought.

I shall call the "Relationship 0£ Feeling," and thus, it
seems, a prerequisite to aesthetic experience.

Conclusion
Langer and Dufrenne tell us that the aesthetic
attitude is not a rarified sensibility.

15. Du£renne, p.57-58.
16. Du£renne, p.59
-

70 -

It is attainable by

 ordinary mortals.

The art obJect itself will help us to

assume this most proper mode of attention .

What we must be

encouraged to do on entering a gallery is to leave our
personal likes and dislikes outside, suspend our propensity
to make hasty Judgments, and open ourselves to the working
of the obJects within.

Through these acts we give the art

obJect the attention it demands.

We begin to £eel its

expressiveness, to understand its unique nature, and to
establish a relationship with it, a relationship which may
evolve into the Relationship of Feeling.
Fostering this relationship between gallery visitors
and works of art must be grounded in the nature of the
aesthetic experience, not in concern, £or example, with
heritage, art historical and social contexts, or even visual
literacy.

Such approaches address fragments of the

aesthetic experience, not its central or defining features.
Gallery programmes grounded in the aesthetic experience
acknowledge the unique being of the work of art: it is an
ordinary obJect until it is transformed through the viewer's
experience.

"The work needs man in order to be recognized

as an aesthetic obJect."[17]

Furthermore, through this

approach, the relative importance of the traditional
activities of public art galleries,

<collection,

conservation, research, exhibition and education), may be
more equable, £or each is an important contributor to this

17. Dufrenne, p.55.
Note: Du£renne's term "aesthetic
obJect" is the equivalent 0£ my phrase "work of art."
- 71 -

 purpose.

Adopting this approach demands that gallery

personnel recognize the unique nature 0£ works 0£ art, their
expressiveness, and attend to viewers~ acknowledgement of
that expressiveness in their aesthetic experiences • . Gallery
educators, in particular, must be aware of the three ·1evels
in the aesthetic experience, as a paradigm £or the
interaction of viewers with art obJects.

Most especially,

educators must attend to the level 0£ Feeling, fostering the
advent of this relationship, the de£ining feature of the
aesthetic experience.
Helping viewers to establish this personal
interaction with the work seems a perplexing task.

Du£~enne

provides an insight by suggesting that in Feeling:
An understanding of the work comes no
longer from the discovery 0£ who produced it but,
rather, from seeing how it produces and unfolds
itself.
In the end, we probably understand the
development and behavior 0£ a living being in
exactly the same way.C18l
Encouraging viewers to adopt an attitude to works 0£ art
similar to that they have toward a valued £riend, may go £ar
to establish the sensibility which provides for the growth
0£ the Relationship 0£ Feeling.
How, then, shall we foster this attitude?

We have

noted that viewers must open themselves to the work,
allowing i t to become present, to establish disinterested
attention and psychical distance, and to guide their

18. Dufrenne, p.393
- 72 -

 need to look at the art obJect in a way which brings an
understanding that its nature results not so much £ram
external £actors as £ram internal necessities, £rom its
"'personality," as it were.

This way 0£ regarding obJects is

not our normal mode 0£ attention.

As Du£renne suggeits, we

usually look at obJects in order to put them to use.

Our

thought about them is controlled more by our intentions
toward them than by the nature 0£ the obJects themselves.
We rarely regard obJects as

11

£riends."

I suggest that this senstitive way 0£ looking may be
established through the £catering 0£ sympathetic attention
in what I shall call "relational seeing."
Fry suggested

11

It is, as Roger

a special £ocussing 0£ the attention.

. to

the e££ects 0£ sensations apprehended in their
relations."(19]

In this way 0£ seeing, we relate everything

the eye registers to other things within the work, making
connections and comparisons, seeing contrasts, establishing
relationships.

We relate our ideas to what we see in the

work, to what understanding tells us must be so because of
its unique personality.

Our intellectual thought evolves as

it were, out 0£ the seeing.
Gallery education programmes should provide viewers
with the groundwork £or relational seeing: a collection of
ways 0£ getting at the relationships 0£ forms,

content, and

contexts, and a sense 0£ which ways best suit particular

19. Fry, p.5.
-

73 -

 types of art.

As Gombrich suggests:

The eye is not a passive but an active
instrument, serving a mind that must be selective
if it is not to be swamped by a flood of
indigestible messages.
Seeing is always looking
for something, comparing, interpreting, probing,
and disregarding."C20J
When centered in the art obJect through relational seeing,
the selection process is regulated by the work of art.
Comparisons, interpretations, investigations and
eliminations are made in relation to what the viewers see
before them.

The work of art is not expected to be other

than what it is: a realist landscape, specific in time and
place, is thought of in terms of its verisimilitude, and a
non-obJective work in terms of its unique reality.

The

requisite distance is established, and the viewer can begin
to discover the unique meaning of the work of art:
expressiveness.

its

The advent of the Relationship of Feeling

becomes a possibility.
Relational seeing will foster sympathetic
reflection, yet gallery educators must go further.

The

expressiveness of the work of art cannot be verbalized.

It

begins in Presence and is fully known in Feeling. These
levels have unique qualities £or each viewer, for
individuals bring to them their funded experience, both of
li:fe and of art.

The essence o:f these moments of awareness

is individual, quiet, and calm.

Attention to viewers as

20. E.H. Gombrich, Ideals_and_Idols:_Essays_on_Values_in
~istory_and_Art <Oxford: Phaidon, 1979), p.199.
- 74 -

 individuals is important.

Non-verbal interactions with art

obJects and opportunities £or quiet re£lection ne~d to be a
part 0£ educational programmes.
Grounding gallery education programmes in the nature
0£ the aesthetic experience demands an act 0£ faith, £or
nothing can

11

make

11

aesthetic experiences happen.

Gallery

educators can help people to treat art obJects with respect
and sensitivity, to understand the work 0£ art in the same
way as they

11

•

• understand others when their actions come

:from internal nece·s si ty, necessity arising £ram their
personality.

11

C21J

In the end, con£idence must be placed in

· the power o:f the work o:f art, and in the sensibility o:f the
viewer, a trust that eventually the spectator will risk
entering the Relationship 0£ Feeling.

21. Du:frenne, p.394.
-

75 -

 POSTSCRIPT

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

The recommendations in this thesis support the need
to gather in£ormation about viewers.

We must know more

about the people who visit art galleries.
come?

What types 0£ questions bother them?

level 0£ aesthetic awareness?

Why do they
What is their

Are viewers with di££erent

aesthetic levels attracted to di££erent kinds of
exhibitions?

Which educational strategies fit various ages

and types of viewers?

Are some strategies suitable to

certain kinds 0£ art?

Empirical research, such as that

undertaken by Abigail Housen, is necessary.

In 1977, Housen

investigated the range 0£ aesthetic development in art
gallery visitors.

She discerned £ive levels 0£ awareness,

beginning with vie~ers who interpret art obJects in a purely
personal manner as "good," or "bad," extending through
analytic and intellectual viewers, to spectators who
understand art obJects as unique expressive £arms with
internal rules, and meanings that generate a special
£eeling.

She noted that the awareness 0£ viewers in£orms

not only their statements and Judgments, but also their
behaviour.
. the styles are accurate predicators
- 76 -

 0£ the ways in which viewers unconsciously move
through the galleries: the paths they make through
the museum space,, where they stop, what they look
at,, what they read, and how long it takes to
complete these activities.
She suggested that "the aesthetic mode" may be a v~lid way
0£ establishing viewer categories and, as a consequence, 0£
tailoring education programmes to £it viewer needs.

Further

investigation established that the standard £are in the
gallery she investigated,

<guided tours and lectures>,

addressed the needs 0£ only one level. (1]

Heusen's study

demonstrates that research conducted through controlled
investigation methods is valuable.

Her observations

demonstrate that use£ul in£ormation may also be discovered
by watching viewers and conversing with them.

Her £indings

suggest that gallery educators need to employ a broad range
0£ educational techniques.

Programming
Many strategies presently used by gallery educators
address £acets 0£ the aesthetic experience.

Educators have

been trying, through participatory tours and an emphasis on
questioning and discussion, to encourage viewers to interact
with the art obJect in personal ways.

Still, the maJority

0£ techniques seem to £aster Structural Re£lection. A shi£t

1. Abigail Housen,, "What is Beyond, or Be£ore the Lecture
Tour? A Study 0£ Aesthetic Modes 0£ Understanding,," ~~t
Education, Vol.33,, No.1 (Jan.1980), pp.17-18.
- 77 -

 in emphasis seems to be needed.

I shall not discuss,

there£ore, such strategies as discussion and critical
analysis.

Rather, I shall turn my attention to some

techniques which may help individual viewers, and £oater
Sympathetic Re£lection.

Helping the Individual Viewer

1.

The_"Talking_Label.
Mary Sparling, Director, Mount
Saint Vincent University Art Gallery, Hali£ax, coined
this term in describing her approach, which combines
gallery security and education.
At "the Mount, .. one
o££ice desk is right in the gallery.
Viewers are
welcomed, and their needs addressed individually.
This suggests that the security of£icers necessary in
most galleries are an untapped resource £or
education.
They are often the only help available to
mysti£ied viewers and, a£ter some training, could
answer questions about the works of art and give help
in viewing.
Another approach would be the hiring 0£
artists as security sta£f.
Because 0£ their knowledge
of the art-making process, artists could give people
insights available from no-one else.
Thia could not
only help individual visitors in their relationships
with art, but also spark greater interest in
exhibitions and collections, and further the welcoming
atmosphere many galleries are attempting to £ester.
This has been suggested to the National Gallery of
Canada. (2]

2.

Individualized_Grou2_Tours. Individual quiet viewing
should precede the group tour, so that viewers may
absorb something of the presence 0£ the works of art,
and follow it so that individual relationships with
the works may develop.
Viewers, rather than educators
or guides, should choose the art obJects for
discussion.
Educators and guides should listen
carefully to comments and questions, £or these
indicate viewers' awareness and interests.
Discussion
should center on viewers' reactions, answering their
queries, or relating to their needs.
Using the

11

2. "CARFAC Report Slams National Gallery, .. Museogramme,
Vol.11, No.4 <Aug.1983), p.3.
- 78 -

 labels, catalogue, or didactic panels as educational
tools, to find answers to viewers' questions, will
help overcome the reluctance of many people to consult
them.
Viewers should be shown how information from
these may establish connections within the work,
contrasts with other works, and answer questions.
Those who wish to look at the works of art on their
own, apart from the group, should not be discouraged,
£or individual enJoyment is the aim 0£ this type of
tour.
3.

Seguenced_Exeeriences. An educational gallery, an
orientation room, or talks, tou~s and audio-visual
presentations which lead viewers from art obJects 0£
lesser difficulty <representational) to those of
greater difficulty <conceptual) could be helpful.

4.

Information_Sheets. At present, these often emphasize
art historical information.
Suggestions for ways of
looking at an exhibition, comparisons, contrasts, and
questions which address personal relationships with
art obJects, should be included.
Ideas such as "Don't
worry about looking at everything, but look at what
interests you most," and "Look first, and then read
the label," could help many viewers.
Indications of
where to £ind various kinds 0£ information in the
catalogue might be included.
In this strategy,
brevity and simplicity may be the keys to success, £or
visitors are not likely to read an extensive outline.

Attending to Sympathetic Reflection

1.

E•ehasizing_Exeression. Discussion should demonstrate
that the nature 0£ the art obJect governs our
interpretations.
The unique .. personality" of the work
0£ art should be emphasized.
Viewers should be lead
to see that £orms seem to hold inherent meaning.

2.

Studio_Activities. Before gallery experiences, viewers
may, through working with art materials, gain some
understanding of the artist's feelings, problems and
Joys in making an art obJecta
This approach should
emphasize experimentation rather than the production
of "finished" art obJects.

3.

HY§!g. Playing music chosen to harmonize with the
expressiveness of the works in an exhibition, and
using appropriate music at the beginning and end 0£
tours, might £oater the reflective attitude.

4a

Seecial_Intereretations_Through_the_Arts. Musical,
dance, mime, and dramatic presentations have been part
- 79 -

 0£ gallery programming £or many years.
Newer,
perhaps, is the recognition that such programmes can
£oater a deeper understanding of the work of art,
especially i£ choices are care£ully made and viewers
are aware 0£ the purpose.
Such a programme took place
at Mount Saint Vincent Gallery in 1982. These
presentations included some viewer participation in
mime, music making, and art making.
I was surprised
by the e££ect on my own aesthetic awareness.
Here is
an area ripe for experimentation, documentatiori, and
research.

- 80 -

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~ng_~~~-

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Goodman, Nelson.
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1967 rpt.

-------Problems_o£_Art:_Ten_PhilosoQhical_Lectures.
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CARFAC Report Slams National Gallery."
11, No.4 <Aug.1983>.

Museoqramme.

Newsome, Barbara Y., and Adele Z.Silver, eds.
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Aesthetica_and_Art_Theory:_An_Historical
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Aesthetic_Ouality:_A_Contextualistic
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11

Winsor and Newton's Series 7."
Winsor and Newton, 1982.

Princeton:

Product Folder.

- 82 -

London: